A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
When Wellington became Generalissimo of the Spanish armies,
he not infrequently gave orders to Roche to join Murray rather than
Elio--apparently conceiving that the fact that the division lived on
the British subsidy had placed it on a somewhat different footing from
the rest of the Murcians.
If we count Whittingham and Roche as attached to the Expeditionary
Army at Alicante, the strength of that heterogeneous host would have
been rather over 21,000 men--a total perceptibly greater than Suchet’s
field-force encamped over against it on the Xucar. And in addition
there lay close behind, within the borders of the kingdom of Murcia,
Elio and his ‘Second Army,’ which, even after deducting Roche’s
division, was a considerable accumulation of troops. But the Murcian
army’s record was more unhappy than that of any other Spanish unit, and
it had been dashed to pieces once more in the preceding July, at the
discreditable battle of Castalla. Though it nominally counted 30,000
men in its six divisions, only three of them were available[403],
for two were really no more than the old guerrillero bands of the
Empecinado and Duran, who hung about in Southern Aragon, and shifted
for themselves. They were both remote and disorganized. Since Roche’s
division was also often out of Elio’s control, he really had no more
than 13,000 infantry and 2,000 horse in hand.
There were facing Suchet, of allied troops of one sort and another,
some 35,000 men, a fact which the Marshal never ceased to utilize in
his correspondence with Madrid, when he wished to excuse himself from
lending aid to his neighbours. But the Murcian army had still not
recovered from the demoralization caused by the battle of Castalla, and
the Alicante army was suffering from two evils which reduced its value
as a campaigning force to a very low level. The first was a terrible
deficiency of transport. When Lord William Bentinck sent out the
first expeditionary force from Sicily, he intended it to equip itself
with mules, horses, and carts in Spain. But in the summer of 1812 the
Kingdom of Murcia was the only unoccupied region on the east side of
the Peninsula, and all its not too copious resources were wanted for
its own army. Successive captains-general refused, not unnaturally, to
help Maitland or Murray in the task of collecting sumpter-beasts, and
suggested that they ought to draw both animals and food from Sicily.
Food was indeed procured from thence, and even from Algeria and the
Levant, so that the army did not starve. But there was insufficient
means to move that food from the water’s edge. A certain number of
mules were collected by paying very heavy hire--not at all to the
gratification of the Spanish authorities, who wanted them for their
own use. But they were so few that the Army could make no long general
marches, and could count on little more than what the men carried in
their haversacks. The best that could be done was to move it forward
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