A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Either in consequence of this rout, or by mere chance at the same
moment[437], the columns which had been assailing Whittingham so long
and ineffectively, also recoiled in disorder before a charge of the
last four companies of the Spanish reserve. The whole of the French
right wing had suffered complete and disastrous defeat. The left
division, Habert’s, was still intact and had never committed itself
to any serious approach to Mackenzie’s front. But six of the eighteen
French battalions in the field were in absolute rout at half-past four
o’clock, and Suchet’s right wing was completely exposed--his cavalry
were two miles away to the left, and out of reach for the moment. All
eye-witnesses agree that if Murray had ordered an immediate general
advance of the line from Castalla westward, the Marshal would have been
lost, and cut off from his sole line of retreat on the pass of Biar.
Murray, however, refused to move till he had brought up his unengaged
right wing to act as a reserve, and only when they had filed up through
the streets of Castalla, gave the order for the whole army to descend
from the heights and push forward.
It was far too late: Suchet had retreated from the Cerro del Doncel
the moment that he saw his attack repulsed, Habert’s division and the
guns covering Robert’s routed wing. The cavalry came galloping back
from the east, and long before Murray was deployed, Suchet took up a
new and narrow front covering the entry of the pass of Biar. The only
touch with his retreating force was kept by Mackenzie, who (contrary
to Murray’s intention) pushed forward with four of his battalions in
front of the main body, and got engaged with Suchet’s rearguard. He
might probably have beaten it in upon the disordered troops behind, if
he had not received stringent orders to draw back and fall in to the
general front of advance. By the time that the whole allied army was
deployed, the French, save a long line of guns across the mouth of the
pass, with infantry on the slopes on each side, had got off. Thereupon,
after making a feeble demonstration with some light companies against
the enemy’s left flank, Murray halted for the night. The enemy used the
hours of darkness to make a forced march for Fuente la Higuera, and
were invisible next day.
Suchet declared that he had lost no more than 800 men in the three
combats of Yecla, Biar, and Castalla, an incredible statement, as
the French casualty rolls show 65 officers killed and wounded on the
11th-12th-13th of April; and such a loss implies 1,300 rank and file
hit--possibly more, certainly not many less. It is certain that his
800 casualties will not suffice even for Castalla alone, where with 47
officers _hors de combat_ he must have lost more probably 950 than 800
men. But the 14 officer-casualties at Biar imply another 280 at the
least, and we know from his own narrative that he lost 4 officers and
80 men in destroying Mijares’ unfortunate battalions at Yecla[438].
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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