A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
suggest your line of retreat.... Your march, as proposed (i.e. via the
Guadarrama) at least as far as Villacastin, would be secure, whereas
that by Talavera, &c., would not, till you shall cross the Tagus. Do
not order the bridge at Almaraz to be taken up or destroyed, till you
are certain you do not want it.’[131] The dispatch ended by directing
Hill to bring on with him Carlos de España’s, Morillo’s, and Penne
Villemur’s Spaniards, but to order Freire, Elio, and Bassecourt to join
Ballasteros by the route of Toledo, while the Empecinado had better go
to his old haunts in the mountains beyond Guadalajara.
This was a most alarming dispatch for Hill. Just as he had assumed
his fighting position, and was expecting to be attacked by Soult on
the following day, he received orders to retire without a moment’s
delay. And what was worst of all, he was told that the line of
retreat indicated to him would not improbably prove dangerous or
impossible, and that he might, within the next day or so, get a
counter-order, directing him to retire by the line of the Tagus and
Almaraz, since a junction with Wellington behind the Adaja might prove
impossible. But a retreat across the front of the enemy, on the route
Navalcarnero-Talavera-Almaraz, would clearly be most dangerous, since
the left wing of the Army (the Light Division, D’Urban, Alten and the
Spaniards) would have forty miles to march before they were clear of
the advancing columns of the French, debouching from Aranjuez. And to
make matters worse, the enemy was terribly strong in cavalry, and the
countryside south of Madrid was very favourable to the mounted arm. If
the army should march at once for the road by the Guadarrama, and when
it had reached the neighbourhood of Madrid or the Escurial should get
the news that the route to Villacastin and Arevalo had been blocked,
it would be almost impossible to turn off on to the Tagus line or
to make for Almaraz. The only chance left would be to take the bad
mountain-road to Avila, and thence to the upper Tormes, a choice that
no officer could contemplate without dismay in October.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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