=445. Stephens and Lincoln on the Causes of the War.=—Soon after the inaugural ceremonies in the South, the newly chosen Vice President, in a speech at Savannah, explained the grounds of secession. After referring to Thomas Jefferson, he said: “The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen of the time of the formation of the old Constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. . . . Our government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth.”[198] For the purpose of reducing the causes of the war to a nutshell, this utterance may be placed in contrast with the summary of the Northern views by Lincoln: “Slavery is wrong and must not be extended. No state can in any way get out of the Union without the consent of the others. It is the duty of the President and of the other public functionaries to run the machine as it is.” At about the same time, in answer to an inquiry, Lincoln wrote to Stephens: “You think slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while we think it is wrong, and ought to be restricted. That, I suppose, is the rub. It certainly is the only substantial difference between us.” =446. Misunderstandings and Mistakes.=—While the South believed, as had so often been claimed by Calhoun and Davis, that it had a right to secede and that the North had no right to oppose secession with force, each side was deceived in regard to the strength and real purpose of the other. The South made the mistake of believing that the Douglas Democrats would not unite with the Republicans, and the North greatly underestimated the determination and the readiness for war on the part of the South. Neither side seems to have more than half believed that the other side would fight. As the South was far more ready than the North, it was certain that, in case of war, the South would gain the first victories. But as the North had far greater resources, it was also certain that, with equal skill and determination, the North would in the end be successful. Each side held that its own strength would prevent the other side from entering upon war. Seward was so optimistic as to believe that as soon as the North showed its determination, the South would yield, and war would be “over in ninety days.” If each side had thoroughly understood the other, probably no war would have occurred. But, not understanding each other, “one side,” as Lincoln once said, “would make war rather than let the nation survive, and the other would accept war rather than let it perish.”