A history of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, and of Dinuzulu's arrest, trial, and expatriationStuart, James
History
A history of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, and of Dinuzulu's arrest, trial, and expatriation
Stuart, James
Dinuzulu, approximately 1868-1913; Zulu Rebellion, 1906; Zululand (South Africa) -- History
On the following day (Sunday), Sibindi was sent back into the thorns,
supported by a squadron U.M.R. (100), under Major S. Carter, with
instructions to complete the bush driving. The Reserves occupied a
ridge north-west of Mpanza valley. Owing to Sibindi's men being too
tired, on reaching Marshall's hotel at 4 p.m., to go further that day,
Carter camped with him on an old mealie garden immediately behind
Marshall's. By 9 a.m. on the 9th, all the troops being in position,
Bambata's stronghold, about three miles north-west of Marshall's,
was surrounded. It was found vacated, with evidences about it of
quite recent occupation by a considerable force. The rough and very
thickly-wooded country in the neighbourhood of Mpanza was thoroughly
scoured in different directions on the 9th, 10th and other days; the
kraals of rebels were burnt and their stock seized. Many, who had,
in various ways, managed to hold aloof from the insurgents, were met
with. In consequence of being at their kraals within the area of
operations, notwithstanding warning to be outside, several narrowly
escaped being shot. The crops, not having quite matured, had not been
reaped. Those belonging to, and abandoned by, the rebels, were given to
the loyalists. The Reserves were demobilized on the 10th, whilst the
artillery and infantry withdrew to Greytown on the same day, followed
by the U.M.R. on the 11th.
The intelligence that Bambata had fled to Zululand had been fully
confirmed by the 10th. The advisability of pursuing the fugitives was
thereupon considered by Leuchars. Quick pursuit is undoubtedly in
accordance with Native tactics on such occasions, but Leuchars believed
it was part of the rebels' plans to decoy his force to Nkandhla and
thereby afford the remainder and larger portion of Bambata's tribe,
say, in combination with Silwana's people, an opportunity of attacking
Greytown and the many outlying European homesteads. Proof of the
possibility of such attack lay in the fact of Bambata's force having
concealed itself a few weeks previously in Layman's trees, on the day
other members of the tribe went to pay the poll tax in Greytown.
Leuchars, however, had other and broader grounds for advising against
troops being sent from Natal at this critical moment. To have withdrawn
a large portion of the Active Militia would have been to place all
civilized portions of the Colony in jeopardy, especially as no Imperial
troops were available. The Matabeles, it will be remembered, rose in
rebellion in 1896 when the greater portion of the Chartered Company's
forces were absent in connection with the Jameson Raid (December,
1895).[147]
The ways and means of dealing with the situation at Nkandhla were fully
considered by the Commandant and the Government, when it was decided to
employ irregular troops in Zululand, and so obviate as much as possible
the necessity of withdrawing the local Militia. Hence the Commandant's
instructions to Leuchars were to remain where he was.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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