A history of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, and of Dinuzulu's arrest, trial, and expatriationStuart, James
History
A history of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, and of Dinuzulu's arrest, trial, and expatriation
Stuart, James
Dinuzulu, approximately 1868-1913; Zulu Rebellion, 1906; Zululand (South Africa) -- History
The Commissioner reported on the 16th that he had had no message from
Sigananda for some days. The messengers he had sent on the preceding
day had returned to say the Chief had nothing to report. It was at
this moment Mr. Saunders arrived at the conviction that Sigananda was
acting in concert with Bambata, and had been deliberately harbouring
him all along. He, thereupon, dropped all further communication with
the Chief, and recommended strong measures being taken as soon as
possible to severely punish him and his tribe. This, however, it was
added, could only be done by considerably strengthening the European
force and obtaining the assistance of loyal Natives. He reiterated
his belief that Dinuzulu was not implicated in any way. At 6.15 p.m.,
information came in from different sources that Bambata, with the
assistance of Sigananda, intended to attack the magistracy the same
night. Sigananda had, by then, been joined by portions of Ndube's,
Mpumela's and Gayede's tribes, the last-named a Natal Chief. At 7.30
p.m. the situation was reported as still more serious, especially as
members of different tribes, including that of Siteku (Dinuzulu's
uncle) had joined Sigananda. It was felt a large force should be sent
up as speedily as possible to reinforce the loyal levies and restore
public confidence. The rebel force estimated then to be at Nkandhla was
500 to 1,000.
As the supplies at Empandhleni appeared to be running short,[155]
arrangements were promptly made by the Commandant for the dispatch of
a convoy of forty waggons of provisions from Dundee, accompanied by an
escort of 400 Natal Carbineers,[156] and one section B Battery, Natal
Field Artillery (Lieut. F.H. Acutt), under Lieut.-Col. D.W. Mackay.
Such force could not, however, leave before the 20th.
* * * * *
The policy of calling on Sigananda, unaided by European troops, to
arrest a well-armed body of desperadoes,[157] who had succeeded in
taking possession of the great local stronghold, is not an easy one
to defend, especially when it is borne in mind that Natives in all
parts of Natal and Zululand had, for three or four months past, loudly
complained of the poll tax, many in Zululand having still to pay. Only
a fraction of what was due by Sigananda's people had been collected.
It was known the majority considered it a tax that could not be borne
in addition to other obligations. Moreover, the news of the Byrnetown
outbreak in February; of the hostile demonstrations at such places as
Mapumulo, Umzinto, Mid-Illovo, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and at their
own magistracy; of the movements of the Militia in the western and
eastern portions of Natal; as well as of the successful assaults on the
Magistrate's party on the 3rd, and on the large body of Police on the
4th, was all calculated to greatly unsettle the Native mind.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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