A history of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, and of Dinuzulu's arrest, trial, and expatriationStuart, James
History
A history of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, and of Dinuzulu's arrest, trial, and expatriation
Stuart, James
Dinuzulu, approximately 1868-1913; Zulu Rebellion, 1906; Zululand (South Africa) -- History
After the rush had been broken, N.M.R. galloped in line of squadrons up
Peyana, accompanied by the machine guns. It so happened that a large
portion of the enemy (about 300), had taken no part whatever in the
charge. They preferred to lie in wait, that, no doubt, being part of
the plan. They were discovered a few yards from where the first lot had
started. For the most part, they turned right about and fled, under
rifle and shell fire, down the precipitous and bushy country in rear of
_B_.
When the position at the kop had been taken, Arnott ordered the
B.M.R. (by this time strengthened by C squadron, under Capt. J.L.
Gordon),[268] to descend on foot into the small valley of scrub, etc.,
on the right of, and below, _A_. This was thereupon driven from top
to bottom by C squadron at the point of the bayonet. Gordon sighted a
large _impi_ in Mvoti valley that had not been engaged; he continued to
watch its movements until recalled to the column.
Arnott now marched in open order, with as broad a front as the country
would permit, until Hlonono Mission Station was reached. Here the
ridges overlooking low ground on the south-west were lined, with a
front of about half a mile. The main body of the rebels, estimated at
3,000 to 4,000 strong, was presently seen about one and a half miles
off, and between the station and Meseni's principal kraal, evidently
trying to get round the column's right flank. As soon as it came within
artillery range, fire was opened from Itshelensimbi hill. This, in a
few minutes, succeeded in checking the advance.
The object of the reconnaissance having been achieved, viz. locating
the position and strength of the enemy, the column began to withdraw to
the camp at Otimati. During the retirement, which was carried out in
good order, the field guns shelled the _impi_ whenever it appeared,
thereby preventing the rear-guard from being harassed in any way.
Some seventy Natives were killed during the engagement. The casualties
among the troops were of a minor description, no one being killed.
Examination of the plan will show that the ambush was of a very
ingenious character, the locality selected being exactly suited for the
purpose. Troops less wary would probably have been trapped. The plan
evidently was to draw them towards _E_, when the two _impis_, barely
fifty yards from one another at _B_, would have pounced upon them front
and rear.
The rebels, who were under the command of a brother of Meseni,
Muziwenkosi, carried ordinary shields and assegais. One of them used a
rifle, whilst others had shot-guns. All wore the _tshokobezi_ badge.
The decoys, who were seen before the action began, openly signalled
to the two _impis_ on Peyana, visible to them, but invisible to the
advancing column. This was done by sweeping the grass to right and left
with their shields. Such action, of course, immediately aroused the
suspicions of the troops.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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