Although the combined operations in Umvoti valley, on account of Barker having been opposed at Ponjwana and Leuchars having to bring his guns and ambulance along rough and roadless country, did not achieve McKenzie's principal object, viz. establishing a cordon round Meseni's entire force, they were nevertheless successful in stamping out rebellion in that part. As late as the evening of the 2nd, all reports had gone to show that some 6,000 to 7,000 Natives were under arms in Umvoti valley. But, as the result of the vigorous operations of the 3rd, 4th and 5th, the rebel forces, defeated in action at two points, had entirely vanished. And, with their kraals destroyed and stock captured, no opportunity was allowed them to reorganize with any prospect of success. The _terrain_ here, though difficult to operate in, differed greatly from that at Nkandhla in having no strongholds of any importance. Had the valley been dealt with piece-meal, it is more than probable hostilities would have been kept up longer than they were, and been accompanied with far greater loss of life to the rebels than actually took place. Although the punishment was not as severe as it might have been, it was heavy enough to show Natives the futility of taking up arms against organized European troops. The swoop on Meseni's valley from four widely-separated points was a fine conception, and, although not as effective as it might have been, and was intended by McKenzie to be, the rebels saw enough to realize that an octopus had come down upon them from the surrounding heights, against whose powerful and far-reaching tentacles their own efforts were puny and feeble in the extreme. The reader may remember that a Zulu dreads nothing so much as being surrounded or hemmed in. The very effort to do this on the 3rd no doubt caused many of them to be afflicted with nightmare, for that was the day on which, as they say, "every hill was covered with European troops, which, moving closer and closer, threatened and meted out destruction on every side." On intelligence being brought in at 2 p.m. on the 6th that Meseni was in hiding a short distance off, three squadrons hurriedly left Thring's Post, only, however, to find, after proceeding a couple of miles, that the place was at least nine miles from camp, and required a much larger force to deal with. The troops accordingly returned to camp. Orders were issued the same night that all mounted troops of Leuchars', Woolls-Sampson's and Mackay's columns were to move out at 3.30 a.m. on the 7th in the direction of Glendale. Fortunately there was a bright moon.