Having regard to their inferior weapons, the only chance of success lay in selecting a _terrain_ suitable to their tactics. That, at any rate, would afford breathing-time, for if the theatre of war lay away from railways and in country difficult for horses, the longer would hostilities continue. Thus success was recognized as depending largely on protracting the campaign, by rendering it as difficult as possible for the troops. To start hostilities, again, at the most favourable time, _i.e._ about May, when all the crops had been reaped, was regarded as essential. It is true that the Trewirgie affair occurred in February, but such must be regarded as an exception which proved the rule. The feeling that they could, as it were, "float" a general rebellion was, no doubt, largely derived from the success achieved by a Zulu _impi_ against Potgieter's commando at Holkrantz. The ambuscade at Mpanza, too, was a success, and afforded just the illustration required to support the cry that European bullets would not "enter." As Natives in general greatly dreaded rifle fire, it became necessary to counteract the fear by inventing the "non-entering-bullet" superstition. Had but one or two rebels been killed at Mpanza, not nearly so much would have been made of the superstition as was done. The fact that, at the beginning of June, the position was extremely serious, only shows that the enemy's tactics had been effective, differing widely from the free, open methods practised during the Zulu War. But for the remarkable _coup_ at Mome, the Rebellion might easily have developed to far greater proportions. As it was, many Chiefs on both sides of the Tugela had begun to assist directly or indirectly. And it is clear that the more protracted the fighting, the more Natives at large would have inferred that the Government had got to the end of its resources, and was, therefore, unable to cope with the situation. Once such a notion had been created and been widely believed, anything up to 100,000 might have risen, and so called for an army corps to deal with the outbreak at a cost of £10,000,000 or so. That is the prospect the Ministry had before them at the latter end of May and beginning of June. That principles such as the foregoing would be followed in any future Native war appears axiomatic, particularly as Natives know quite well that their tactics in 1906 were, on the whole, successful; Mome, though a catastrophe, was due to accident or carelessness that could easily have been avoided by a competent commander.