At Macrae's store, the attack came just after sunset and later--the only instance of night attack. When the offensive is assumed by Zulus, the proper time to do so is just before dawn, unless the force be a strong one, when battle would be given in broad daylight. The rebels moved about to get food and seize cattle chiefly at night, sometimes going ten or more miles for the purpose. Those wounded in action, too, were removed after dark. A close watch was always kept on each column, especially by spies posted on hills, where, if out of rifle range, they did not mind whether they exposed themselves or not. Occasionally it happened that those who had fought against the troops, but had been obliged to surrender, took up arms against their own people. Several of such men were utilized as spies, and proved invaluable. _European troops._--Having regard to the number of troops in the field, the importance of the campaign, and the wide area covered by the operations, it would seem the officer in supreme command should have been given the rank of Brigadier or Major-General. The O.C. Troops was, of course, a full Colonel, but, on being appointed over Natal and Zululand, it would, perhaps, have been more in accord with the general duties he had to perform, to have conferred on him a rank conspicuously higher than that of any one else in his command. The rank, however, seeing the campaign was being conducted by Colonial troops, could have been conferred only by the local authorities. The want of a trained staff was much felt by each column. "It is," says Sir Duncan McKenzie,[306] "of great importance that an intelligence department should be formed on the soundest of bases.... It is not sufficient that an intelligence officer should simply be able to speak the language of the country. He should have all the available information at his instant disposal and also be able to guide or conduct his O.C. anywhere.... Intelligence officers should not be attached to any regiment in peace-time, but in the event of a force being required in any district, the intelligence officer from that district should be placed at the disposal of the column commander." All the columns were supplied with excellent intelligence. To the fine work done by Lieut. Hedges and Sergts. Calverley and Titlestad at Nkandhla must be attributed much of the success met with in that district. The two points on which attention was, perhaps, chiefly concentrated were (_a_) methods of dealing with the enemy when concealed in forests, and (_b_) advanced guards. That such matters assumed the importance they did, was due to the enemy habitually leaving the initiative to be taken by the troops. The troops never went out to drive forests, but some catastrophe was possible. The greatest circumspection had invariably to be exercised, not so much because unable to afford the loss of men, as because the loss would have been absurdly magnified by the enemy to obtain further recruits.