But it will be said that the amendment itself implies that certain lawmaking "powers" had been "delegated to the United States by the constitution." No. It only implies that those who adopted the amendment _believed_ that such lawmaking "powers" had been "delegated to the United States by the constitution." But in this belief, they were entirely mistaken. And why? 1. Because it is a natural impossibility that any lawmaking "powers" whatever can be delegated by any one man, or any number of men, to any other man, or any number of other men. Men's natural rights are all inherent and inalienable; and therefore cannot be parted with, or delegated, by one person to another. And all contracts whatsoever, for such a purpose, are necessarily absurd and void contracts. For example. I cannot delegate to another man any right to _make_ laws--that is, laws of his own invention--and compel me to obey them. Such a contract, on my part, would be a contract to part with my natural liberty; to give myself, or sell myself, to him as a slave. Such a contract would be an absurd and void contract, utterly destitute of all legal or moral obligation. 2. I cannot delegate to another any right to make laws--that is, laws of his own invention--and compel a third person to obey them. For example. I cannot delegate to A any right to make laws--that is, laws of his own invention--and compel Z to obey them. I cannot delegate any such right to A, because I have no such right myself; and I cannot delegate to another what I do not myself possess. For these reasons no lawmaking powers ever could be--and therefore no lawmaking powers ever were--"delegated to the United States by the constitution"; no matter what the people of that day--any or all of them--may have attempted to do, or may have believed they had power to do, in the way of delegating such powers. But not only were no lawmaking powers "delegated to the United States by the constitution," but neither were any _judicial_ powers so delegated. And why? Because it is a natural impossibility that one man can delegate his judicial powers to another. Every man has, by nature, certain judicial powers, or rights. That is to say, he has, by nature, the right to judge of, and enforce his own rights, and judge of, and redress his own wrongs. But, in so doing, he must act only in accordance with his own judgment and conscience, _and subject to his own personal responsibility, if, through either ignorance or design, he commits any error injurious to another_. Now, inasmuch as no man can delegate, or impart, his own judgment or conscience to another, it is naturally impossible that he can delegate to another his judicial rights or powers.