But how futile have been all expectations of justice from the judiciary, may be seen in the conduct of the courts--and especially in that of the so-called Supreme Court of the United States--in regard to men's natural right to make their own contracts. Although the State lawmakers have, more frequently than the national lawmakers, made laws in violation of men's natural right to make their own contracts, yet all laws, State and national, having for their object the destruction of that right, have always, without a single exception, I think, received the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States. And having been sanctioned by that court, they have been, as a matter of course, sanctioned by all the other courts, State and national. And this work has gone on, until, if these courts are to be believed, nothing at all is left of men's natural right to make their own contracts. That such is the truth, I now propose to prove. And, first, as to the State governments. The constitution of the United States (_Art. 1, Sec. 10_) declares that: No State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. This provision does not designate what contracts have, and what have not, an "obligation." But it clearly presupposes, implies, assumes, and asserts that there are contracts that _have_ an "obligation." Any State law, therefore, which declares that such contracts shall have _no obligation_, is plainly in conflict with this provision of the constitution of the United States. This provision, also, by implying that there _are_ contracts, that _have_ an "obligation," _necessarily implies that men have a right to enter into them_; for if men had no right to enter into the contracts, the contracts themselves could have no "obligation." This provision, then, of the constitution of the United States, not only implies that there are contracts that _have_ an obligation, _but it also implies that the people have the right to enter into all such contracts, and have the benefit of them_. And "_any_" State "_law_," conflicting with either of these implications, is necessarily unconstitutional and void. Furthermore, the language of this provision of the constitution, to wit, "the obligation [singular] of contracts" [plural], implies _that there is one and the same "obligation" to all "contracts" whatsoever, that have any legal obligation at all_. And there obviously must be some one principle, that gives validity to all contracts alike, that have any validity. The law, then, of this whole country, as established by the constitution of the United States, is, that all contracts whatsoever, in which this one principle of validity, or "obligation," is found, shall be held valid; and that the States shall impose no restraint whatever upon the people's entering into all such contracts.