Why, then, is it, that they strike down this right, without ceremony, and without compunction, whenever they are commanded to do so by the lawmakers? It is because, and solely because, they are so servile, slavish, degraded, and corrupt, as to act habitually on the principle, that justice and men's natural rights are matters of no importance, in comparison with the commands of the impudent and tyrannical lawmakers, on whom they are dependent for their offices and their salaries. It is because, and solely because, they, like the judges under all other irresponsible and tyrannical governments, are part and parcel of a conspiracy for robbing and enslaving the great body of the people, to gratify the luxury and pride of a few. It is because, and solely because, they do not recognize our governments, State or national, as institutions designed simply to maintain justice, or to protect all men in the enjoyment of all their natural rights; but only as institutions designed to accomplish such objects as irresponsible cabals of lawmakers may agree upon. In proof of all this, I give the following. Previous to 1824, two cases had come up from the State courts, to the Supreme Court of the United States, involving the question whether a State law, _invalidating some particular contract_, came within the constitutional prohibition of "any law impairing the obligation of contracts." One of these cases was that of _Fletcher vs. Peck_, (6 _Cranch_ 87), in the year 1810. In this case the court held simply that a grant of land, once made by the legislature of Georgia, could not be rescinded by a subsequent legislature. But no general definition of "the obligation of contracts" was given. Again, in the year 1819, in the case of _Dartmouth College vs. Woodward_ (4 _Wheaton_ 518), the court held that a charter, granted to Dartmouth College, by the king of England, before the Revolution, was a contract; and that a law of New Hampshire, annulling, or materially altering, the charter, without the consent of the trustees, was a "law impairing the obligation" of _that_ contract. But, in this case, as in that of _Fletcher vs. Peck_, the court gave no general definition of "the obligation of contracts." But in the year 1824, and again in 1827, in the case of _Ogden vs. Saunders_ (12 _Wheaton_ 213) the question was, whether an insolvent law of the State of New York, which discharged a debtor from a debt, _contracted after the passage of the law_, or, as the courts would say, "_contracted under the law_"--on his giving up his property to be distributed among his creditors--was a "law impairing the obligation of contracts?"