The constitution assumes that this _one_ "obligation of contracts," which it designs to protect, is the natural one, because it assumes that it existed, _and was known_, at the time the constitution itself was established; and certainly no _one_ "obligation," _other than the natural one_, can be said to have been known, as applicable to all obligatory contracts, at the time the constitution was established. Unless, therefore, the constitution be presumed to have intended the natural "obligation," it cannot be said to have intended any _one_ "obligation" whatever; or, consequently, to have forbidden the violation of any _one_ "obligation" whatever. It cannot be said that "the obligation," which the constitution designed to protect was any arbitrary "obligation," that was unknown at the time the constitution was established, but that was to be created, and made known afterward; for then this provision of the constitution could have had no effect, until such arbitrary "obligation" should have been created, and made known. And as it gives us no information as to how, or by whom, this arbitrary "obligation" was to be created, or what the obligation itself was to be, or how it could ever be known to be the one that was intended to be protected, the provision itself becomes a mere nullity, having no effect to protect any "obligation" at all. It would be a manifest and utter absurdity to say that the constitution intended to protect any "obligation" whatever, unless it be presumed to have intended some particular "obligation," _that was known at the time_; for that would be equivalent to saying that the constitution intended to establish a law, of which no man could know the meaning. But this is not all. The right of property is a natural right. The only real right of property, that is known to mankind, is the natural right. Men have also a natural right to convey their natural rights of property from one person to another. And there is no means known to mankind, by which this _natural_ right of property can be transferred, or conveyed, by one man to another, except by such contracts as are _naturally_ obligatory; that is, naturally capable of conveying and binding the right of property. All contracts whatsoever, that are naturally capable, competent, and sufficient to convey, transfer, and bind the natural right of property, are naturally obligatory; and really and truly do convey, transfer, and bind such rights of property as they purport to convey, transfer, and bind. All the other modes, by which one man has ever attempted to acquire the property of another, have been thefts, robberies, and frauds. But these, of course, have never conveyed any real rights of property.