1. They say that, if a law forbids any particular contract to be made, such contract, being then an illegal one, can have no "obligation." Consequently, say they, the law cannot be said to impair it; because the law cannot impair an "obligation," that has never had an existence. They say this of all contracts, that are arbitrarily forbidden; although, naturally and intrinsically, they have as valid an obligation as any others that men ever enter into, or as any that courts enforce. By such a naked trick as this, these courts not only strike down men's natural right to make their own contracts, but even seek to evade that provision of the constitution, which they are all sworn to support, and which commands them to hold valid the _natural_ "obligation" of all men's contracts; "anything in the constitutions or laws of the States to the contrary notwithstanding." They might as well have said that, if the constitution had declared that "no State shall pass any law impairing any man's natural right to life, liberty, or property"--(that is, his _natural_ right to live, and do what he will with himself and his property, so long as he infringes the right of no other person)--this prohibition could be evaded by a State law declaring that, from and after such a date, no person should have any natural right to life, liberty, or property; and that, therefore, a law arbitrarily taking from a man his life, liberty, and property, could not be said to impair his right to them, because no law could impair a right that did not exist. The answer to such an argument as this, would be, that it is a natural truth that every man, who ever has been, or ever will be, born into the world, _necessarily has been, and necessarily will be, born with an inherent right to life, liberty, and property_; and that, in forbidding this right to be impaired, _the constitution presupposes, implies, assumes, and asserts that every man has, and will have, such a right_; and that this _natural_ right is the very right, which the constitution forbids any State law to impair. Or the courts might as well have said that, if the constitution had declared that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts made for the purchase of food," that provision could have been evaded by a State law forbidding any contract to be made for the purchase of food; and then saying that such contract, being illegal, could have no "obligation," that could be impaired. The answer to this argument would be that, by forbidding any State law impairing the obligation of contracts made for the purchase of food, the constitution presupposes, implies, assumes, and asserts that such contracts have, and always will have, a _natural_ "obligation"; and that this _natural_ "obligation" is the very "obligation," which the constitution forbids any State law to impair.