A Letter to Grover Cleveland: On His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and Crimes of Lawmakers and Judges, and the Consequent Poverty, Ignorance, and Servitude Of The PeopleSpooner, Lysander
Philosophy
A Letter to Grover Cleveland: On His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and Crimes of Lawmakers and Judges, and the Consequent Poverty, Ignorance, and Servitude Of The People
Spooner, Lysander
Cleveland, Grover, 1837-1908; United States -- Politics and government
He here asserts that "the supreme power in a State"--that is, the
legislature of a State--has "the _right_" to "_deem_ it _mischievous_"
to allow men to exercise their natural right to make their own
contracts! Contracts that have a natural obligation! And that, if a
State legislature thinks it "mischievous" to allow men to make contracts
that are naturally obligatory, "_its right to prohibit them is
unquestionable_."
Is not this equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and
the people no rights?
On the same principle, and under the same definition of law, the
lawmakers of a State may, of course, hold it "mischievous" to allow men
to exercise any of their other natural rights, as well as their right to
make their own contracts; and may therefore prohibit the exercise of
any, or all, of them.
And this is equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and
the people no rights.
If a government can forbid the free exercise of a single one of man's
natural rights, it may, for the same reason, forbid the exercise of any
and all of them; and thus establish, practically and absolutely,
Marshall's principle, that the government has all power, and the people
no rights.
_In the same case, of Ogden vs. Saunders, Marshall's principle was
agreed to by all the other justices, and all the lawyers!_
Thus Thompson, one of the justices, said:
Would it not be within the legitimate powers of a State
legislature to declare _prospectively_ that no one should be
made responsible, upon contracts entered into before arriving
at the age of _twenty-five_ years? This, I presume, cannot be
doubted.--_p. 300._
On the same principle, he might say that a State legislature may declare
that no person, under fifty, or seventy, or a hundred, years of age,
shall exercise his natural right of making any contract that is
naturally obligatory.
In the same case, Trimble, another of the justices, said:
If the positive law [that is, the statute law] of the State
declares the contract shall have no obligation, _it can have no
obligation, whatever may be the principles of natural law in
regard to such a contract. This doctrine has been held and
maintained by all States and nations. The power of controlling,
modifying, and even taking away, all obligation from such
contracts as, independently of positive enactions to the
contrary, would have been obligatory, has been exercised by all
independent sovereigns._--_p. 320._
Yes; and why has this power been exercised by "all States and nations,"
and "all independent sovereigns"? Solely because these governments have
all--or at least so many of them as Trimble had in his mind--been
despotic and tyrannical; and have claimed for themselves all power, and
denied to the people all rights.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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