17. The destruction of the Macedonian monarchy was attended with consequences equally disastrous to the conquerors and the conquered. To the first it soon gave the notion of becoming the masters of the world, instead of its arbiters; and it exposed the latter, for the next twenty years, to all the evils inseparable from such a catastrophe. The system of politics hitherto pursued by Rome could not last much longer; for if nations suffered themselves to be brought under the yoke by force, it was not to be expected that they would long be held in dependence under the specious name of liberty. But the state of things after this war was such as contributed to hasten a change in the form of the relations which existed between Rome and her allies. The republican constitution given to the already ruined and devastated Macedonians (see above, p. 288.) and Illyrians, and which, according to the decree of the senate, "showed to all people that Rome was ready to bestow liberty upon them," was granted upon such hard conditions, that the enfranchised nation soon used every endeavour to procure themselves a king. Greece however suffered still more than Macedonia. Here, during the war, the spirit of faction had risen to the highest pitch; and the arrogant insolence of the Roman party, composed for the most part of venal wretches, was so great, that they persecuted not only those who had espoused an opposite faction, but even those who had joined no faction at all. Rome nevertheless could not believe herself secure, until she had destroyed, by a cruel artifice, all her adversaries (see above, p. 288). 18. Entirely in the same spirit did Rome proceed against the other states from whom she had anything to fear. These must be rendered defenceless; and every means of effecting that purpose was considered justifiable by the senate. The quarrels between the successors to the throne of Egypt were taken advantage of to cause dissensions in that kingdom (see above, p. 260); while Syria was retained in a state of tutelage, by keeping the rightful heir to the throne at Rome; and its military power neutralized by means of their ambassadors (see above, p. 243). 19. From these facts we may also conclude, that the injuries now meditated against Carthage were not separate projects, but rather formed part of the general system of Roman policy at this period, although particular events at one time retarded their execution, and at another hastened it. History, in recounting the incredibly bad treatment which Carthage had to endure before her fall, seems to have given a warning to those nations who can take it, of what they may expect from the domination of a powerful republic.