A Manual of Moral PhilosophyPeabody, Andrew P. (Andrew Preston)
Philosophy
A Manual of Moral Philosophy
Peabody, Andrew P. (Andrew Preston)
Ethics
The gauntlet thus thrown down by Hobbes was taken up by *Cudworth* (A. D.
1617-1688), the most learned man of his time, whose “Intellectual System
of the Universe” is a prodigy of erudition,—a work in which his own
thought is so blocked up with quotations, authorities, and masses of
recondite lore, that it is hardly possible to trace the windings of the
river for the débris of auriferous rocks that obstruct its flow. The
treatise with which we are concerned is that on “Eternal and Immutable
Morality.” In this he maintains that the right exists, independently of
all authority, by the very nature of things, in co-eternity with the
Supreme Being. So far is he from admitting the possibility of any
dissiliency between the Divine will and absolute right, that he turns the
tables on his opponents, and classes among Atheists those of his
contemporaries who maintain that God can command what is contrary to the
intrinsic right; that He has no inclination to the good of his creatures;
that He can justly doom an innocent being to eternal torments; or that
whatever God wills is just because He wills it.
*Samuel Clarke* (A. D. 1675-1729) followed Cudworth in the same line of
thought. He was, it is believed, the first writer who employed the term
_fitness_ as defining the ground of the immutable and eternal right,
though the idea of fitness necessarily underlies every system or theory
that assigns to virtue intrinsic validity.
*Shaftesbury* (A. D. 1671-1713) represents virtue as residing, not in the
nature or relations of things, but in the bearing of actions on the
welfare or happiness of beings other than the actor. Benevolence
constitutes virtue; and the merit of the action and of the actor is
determined by the degree in which particular affections are merged in
general philanthropy, and reference is had, not to individual
beneficiaries or benefits, but to the whole system of things of which the
actor forms a part. The affections from which such acts spring commend
themselves to the moral sense, and are of necessity objects of esteem and
love. But the moral sense takes cognizance of the affections only, not of
the acts themselves; and as the conventional standard of the desirable and
the useful varies with race, time, and culture, the acts which the
affections prompt, and which therefore are virtuous, may be in one age or
country such as the people of another century or land may repudiate with
loathing. Las Casas, in introducing negro slavery into America, with the
fervently benevolent purpose of relieving the hardships of the feeble and
overtasked aborigines, performed, according to this theory, a virtuous
act; but had he once considered the question of intrinsic right or natural
fitness, a name so worthily honored would never have been associated with
the foulest crime of modern civilization.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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