Where the oldest of these authorities really agree, we accept their united testimony as practically conclusive. It is not at all our design to seek our readings from the later uncials, supported as they usually are by the mass of cursive manuscripts; but to employ their confessedly secondary evidence in those numberless instances wherein their elder brethren are hopelessly at variance(290). We do not claim for the recent documents the high consideration and deference fitly reserved for a few of the oldest; just as little do we think it right to pass them by in silence, and allow to them no more weight or importance than if they had never been written. “There are passages,” to employ the words of a very competent judge, “where the evidence of the better cursives may be of substantial use in confirming a good reading, or in deciding us between two of nearly equal merit to place one in the text and assign the other to the margin(291).” 3. It may readily be supposed that the very few manuscripts which, being ancient themselves, are regarded by the school of Lachmann as alone preserving an ancient and genuine form, have not been selected as virtually the sole authorities for the settling of the sacred text, except for reasons which those who thus adopt them regard as weighty, and which merit at any rate our best consideration before we put them aside as insufficient. The great uncials, we are told, are treated with so much deference, not only or chiefly because they are old, but because they have been rigorously tested and have proved on trial to deserve the confidence which has been reposed in them. The process of investigation shall now be stated, as fairly and even favourably as possible. It is not worth while, as it certainly is not our desire, to snatch a transient advantage by misrepresenting the views we are controverting. We would rather comprise in our own system all that is sound and exact in them, while we withstand the attempt to carry them beyond the limits which they may legitimately occupy, and refuse to generalize on the strength of facts which are only partially true.