For the man of today, who has succeeded in placing the erotic above the egoistic-social impulse, has achieved a height that few, if any, have attained before him, has gained a joy and fullness of living compared with which the so-called happiness of successful marriage according to former standards is but foredawn to noon-day. The existence of this higher type of erotic control leading to the establishment of the non-procreative or social love episode, brings into clearest relief the distinction between control as repression and control as expression. Control as expression is analogous to driving a horse and getting somewhere, control as repression is like unharnessing him and letting him run away. Control of the erotic instinct by repressing is not like shooting the horse, because repression never annihilates an impulse but only removes it from conscious control. Keeping in mind this difference between control by repression, which is only apparent, not real, annihilation, only removal from consciousness and not destruction of the impulse, we shall more easily note the necessary connection between self-control and individuality, i.e., personality. His individuality is just what he makes up his mind, and exercises his utmost imagination, to _do_. His work is his own, only in so far as he controls his actions in doing it, so that they are better than the external demand. If he is an office boy and told to put stamps on envelopes, he can do it and only it, or he can put them on so quickly or so straight that the quickness or straightness is immediately seen as his particular part of the performance. He can control the actions of his work and his play; but, except indirectly, he cannot control his digestion, respiration, blood pressure or circulation. He has to eat more digestible food, or to take more exercise, or to cultivate pressure-raising emotions, or those that lower the blood pressure. He has been taught to believe that his physical constitution and his instincts are tendencies inherited from his ancestors and that he cannot control them. If his instincts or inherited disposition make him lose his temper so that he is not himself, he is supposed not to be responsible for all he does. But is he freed from responsibility because he is temporarily governed by his instincts, or is he steered by his instincts only when and because he throws away responsibility? Is it impulsive, instinctive action that excuses him, or is it excuses that are wanted by him, which makes him call his action, or the part of it he wants to be excused for, instinctive?