I have now finished these poor lectures, and as you look back on them, they doubtless seem rambling and inconclusive enough. My only hope is that they may possibly have proved suggestive; and if indeed they have been suggestive of one point of method, I am almost willing to let all other suggestions go. That point is that _it is high time for the basis of discussion in these questions to be broadened and thickened up_. It is for that that I have brought in Fechner and Bergson, and descriptive psychology and religious experiences, and have ventured even to hint at psychical research and other wild beasts of the philosophic desert. Owing possibly to the fact that Plato and Aristotle, with their intellectualism, are the basis of philosophic study here, the Oxford brand of transcendentalism seems to me to have confined itself too exclusively to thin logical considerations, that would hold good in all conceivable worlds, worlds of an empirical constitution entirely different from ours. It is as if the actual peculiarities of the world that is were entirely irrelevant to the content of truth. But they cannot be irrelevant; and the philosophy of the future must imitate the sciences in taking them more and more elaborately into account. I urge some of the younger members of this learned audience to lay this hint to heart. If you can do so effectively, making still more concrete advances upon the path which Fechner and Bergson have so enticingly opened up, if you can gather philosophic conclusions of any kind, monistic or pluralistic, from the _particulars of life_, I will say, as I now do say, with the cheerfullest of hearts, 'Ring out, ring out my mournful rhymes, but ring the fuller minstrel in.' NOTES LECTURE I Note 1, page 5.--Bailey: _op. cit._, First Series, p. 52. Note 2, page 11.--_Smaller Logic_, § 194. Note 3, page 16.--_Exploratio philosophica_, Part I, 1865, pp. xxxviii, 130. Note 4, page 20.--Hinneberg: _Die Kultur der Gegenwart: Systematische Philosophie_. Leipzig: Teubner, 1907. LECTURE II Note 1, page 50.--The difference is that the bad parts of this finite are eternal and essential for absolutists, whereas pluralists may hope that they will eventually get sloughed off and become as if they had not been. Note 2, page 51.--Quoted by W. Wallace: _Lectures and Essays_, Oxford, 1898, p. 560. Note 3, page 51.--_Logic_, tr. Wallace, 1874, p. 181. Note 4, page 52.--_Ibid._, p. 304. Note 5, page 53.--_Contemporary Review_, December, 1907, vol. 92, p. 618. Note 6, page 57.--_Metaphysic_, sec. 69 ff. Note 7, page 62.--_The World and the Individual_, vol. i, pp. 131-132.