Note 2, page 165.--Fechner: _Über die Seelenfrage_, 1861, p. 170. Note 3, page 168.--Fechner's latest summarizing of his views, _Die Tagesansicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht_, Leipzig, 1879, is now, I understand, in process of translation. His _Little Book of Life after Death_ exists already in two American versions, one published by Little, Brown & Co., Boston, the other by the Open Court Co., Chicago. Note 4, page 176.--Mr. Bradley ought to be to some degree exempted from my attack in these last pages. Compare especially what he says of non-human consciousness in his _Appearance and Reality_, pp. 269-272. LECTURE V Note 1, page 182.--Royce: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, p. 379. Note 2, page 184.--_The World and the Individual_, vol. ii, pp. 58-62. Note 3, page 190.--I hold to it still as the best description of an enormous number of our higher fields of consciousness. They demonstrably do not _contain_ the lower states that know the same objects. Of other fields, however this is not so true; so, in the _Psychological Review_ for 1895, vol. ii, p. 105 (see especially pp. 119-120), I frankly withdrew, in principle, my former objection to talking of fields of consciousness being made of simpler 'parts,' leaving the facts to decide the question in each special case. Note 4, page 194.--I abstract from the consciousness attached to the whole itself, if such consciousness be there. LECTURE VI Note 1, page 250.--For a more explicit vindication of the notion of activity, see Appendix B, where I try to defend its recognition as a definite form of immediate experience against its rationalistic critics. I subjoin here a few remarks destined to disarm some possible critics of Professor Bergson, who, to defend himself against misunderstandings of his meaning, ought to amplify and more fully explain his statement that concepts have a practical but not a theoretical use. Understood in one way, the thesis sounds indefensible, for by concepts we certainly increase our knowledge about things, and that seems a theoretical achievement, whatever practical achievements may follow in its train. Indeed, M. Bergson might seem to be easily refutable out of his own mouth. His philosophy pretends, if anything, to give a better insight into truth than rationalistic philosophies give: yet what is it in itself if not a conceptual system? Does its author not reason by concepts exclusively in his very attempt to show that they can give no insight?