Note 5, page 280.--Green's attempt to discredit sensations by reminding us of their 'dumbness,' in that they do not come already _named_, as concepts may be said to do, only shows how intellectualism is dominated by verbality. The unnamed appears in Green as synonymous with the unreal. Note 6, page 283.--_Philosophy of Reflection_, i, 248 ff. Note 7, page 284.--Most of this paragraph is extracted from an address of mine before the American Psychological Association, printed in the _Psychological Review_, vol. ii, p. 105. I take pleasure in the fact that already in 1895 I was so far advanced towards my present bergsonian position. Note 8, page 289.--The conscious self of the moment, the central self, is probably determined to this privileged position by its functional connexion with the body's imminent or present acts. It is the present _acting_ self. Tho the more that surrounds it may be 'subconscious' to us, yet if in its 'collective capacity' it also exerts an active function, it may be conscious in a wider way, conscious, as it were, over our heads. On the relations of consciousness to action see Bergson's _Matière et Mémoire, passim_, especially chap. i. Compare also the hints in Münsterberg's _Grundzüge der Psychologie_, chap, xv; those in my own _Principles of Psychology_, vol. ii, pp. 581-592; and those in W. McDougall's _Physiological Psychology_, chap. vii. Note 9, page 295.--Compare _Zend-Avesta_, 2d edition, vol. i, pp. 165 ff., 181, 206, 244 ff., etc.; _Die Tagesansicht_, etc., chap, v, § 6; and chap. xv. LECTURE VIII Note 1, page 330.--Blondel: _Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne_, June, 1906, p. 241. APPENDICES APPENDIX A THE THING AND ITS RELATIONS[1] Experience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent. The active sense of living which we all enjoy, before reflection shatters our instinctive world for us, is self-luminous and suggests no paradoxes. Its difficulties are disappointments and uncertainties. They are not intellectual contradictions. When the reflective intellect gets at work, however, it discovers incomprehensibilities in the flowing process. Distinguishing its elements and parts, it gives them separate names, and what it thus disjoins it cannot easily put together. Pyrrhonism accepts the irrationality and revels in its dialectic elaboration. Other philosophies try, some by ignoring, some by resisting, and some by turning the dialectic procedure against itself, negating its first negations, to restore the fluent sense of life again, and let redemption take the place of innocence. The perfection with which any philosophy may do this is the measure of its human success and of its importance in philosophic history. In an article entitled 'A world of pure experience,[2] I tried my own hand sketchily at [Footnote 1: Reprinted from the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, vol. ii, New York, 1905, with slight verbal revision.]