are altered; for the relations, it is said, are but external. But I reply that, if so, I cannot _understand_ the leaving by the terms of one set of relations and their adoption of another fresh set. The process and its result to the terms, if they contribute nothing to it [_surely they contribute to it all there is 'of' it!_] seem irrational throughout. [_If 'irrational' here means simply 'non-rational,' or non-deducible from the essence of either term singly, it is no reproach; if it means 'contradicting' such essence, Mr. Bradley should show wherein and how_.] But, if they contribute anything, they must surely be affected internally. [_Why so, if they contribute only their surface? In such relations as 'on,' 'a foot away,' 'between,' 'next,' etc., only surfaces are in question_.] ... If the terms contribute anything whatever, then the terms are affected [_inwardly altered?_] by the arrangement.... That for working purposes we treat, and do well to treat, some relations as external merely, I do not deny, and that of course is not the question at issue here. That question is ... whether in the end and in principle a mere external relation [_i.e., a relation which can change without forcing its terms to change their nature simultaneously_] is possible and forced on us by the facts.'[1] Mr. Bradley next reverts to the antinomies of space, which, according to him, prove it to be unreal, although it appears as so prolific a medium of external relations; [Footnote 1: _Appearance and Reality_, 2d edition, pp. 575-576.] and he then concludes that 'Irrationality and externality cannot be the last truth about things. Somewhere there must be a reason why this and that appear together. And this reason and reality must reside in the whole from which terms and relations are abstractions, a whole in which their internal connexion must lie, and out of which from the background appear those fresh results which never could have come from the premises' (p. 577). And he adds that 'Where the whole is different, the terms that qualify and contribute to it must so far be different.... They are altered so far only [_how far? farther than externally, yet not through and through?_], but still they are altered.... I must insist that in each case the terms are qualified by their whole [_qualified how?--do their external relations, situations, dates, etc., changed as these are in the new whole, fail to qualify them 'far' enough?_], and that in the second case there is a whole which differs both logically and psychologically from the first whole; and I urge that in contributing to the change the terms so far are altered' (p. 579). Not merely the relations, then, but the terms are altered: _und zwar_ 'so far.' But just _how_ far is the whole problem; and 'through-and-through' would seem (in spite of Mr. Bradley's somewhat undecided utterances[1])