I mentioned that the character of the local Government was 'disrespect and disobedience.' That nothing but a long continuance of strict rule could bring India into real subjection. It was this disobedience which was the chief source of increased expenditure. It arose in a great measure from the unequal hand which had been held over them--the indulgence of the Court of Directors--and the great delays in the communication with India arising out of the system of correspondence. I had endeavoured to remedy that, and hoped to get an answer to letters within the year. It was now two years and a half. I had likewise endeavoured to make arrangements for steam communication by the Red Sea. I hoped to be able to send a letter to Bombay in sixty days. The Cabinet seemed generally to acquiesce in the expediency of only having a Committee this year. At first they all seemed to think the continuance of the government in the Company a matter of course. I told them that even with the China trade the Government could not now go on without great reductions of expenditure, and that I hoped the Cabinet would not come to a hasty decision upon a question involving so many important political and financial considerations. The present system was not one of great expense, but it was one involving great delay--and delay was expense, and not only expense but abandonment of authority. It was in this point of view that I hoped the Cabinet would look at the question when it came before them. I mean to go quietly to work; but I mean, if I can, to substitute the King's government for that of the Company. [Footnote: This was not carried out till 1858, after the great mutiny.] I am sure that in doing so I shall confer a great benefit upon India and effect the measure which is most likely to retain for England the possession of India. We afterwards spoke of the Batta question. I read Lord Wellesley's letter, and stated the opinions of Sir J. Malcolm, Sir Archibald Campbell, and Sir J. Nicholls. I stated that it seemed the feeling in the army was excited more by the apprehension of further reductions than by the establishment of the half- Batta stations; that if concessions were made to the Bengal army, the other armies would be discontented and further demands would be made. The Duke said, as a soldier, and having been in India at the time, he must say he thought the orders of 1828 [Footnote: Orders issued by Lord William Bentinck, abolishing full batta or the larger scale of allowances to the military at stations where half-batta only had been recognised, before the Act of the Bengal Government allowing full batta in consideration of officers providing themselves with quarters.--See Thornton's _British India_, pp. 221-25.] a breach of faith--but these having been issued, he thought we must stand to them. The general opinion was that as nothing could be said or done till the arrival of despatches, there could be no necessity for deciding.