There was an old prophecy to the effect that the great fight would take place on the plains of Kerreri. Here the infidels were to be exterminated, and all the waverers on the side of the faithful were to be killed, the remnant collecting afterwards and then starting off, a purified army, on the conquest of the whole world. Again, it was decided that the faithful were to collect in Omdurman, and allow the infidels to come on. While attacks were being made against them on the western flank and rear, a great sortie was to be made from the town, when the infidels, pressed back to Kerreri plains, would be caught between three fires, and exterminated. The gunboats, with their “devils,” would be afraid to shoot, as they would kill their own people. But no sooner had this been decided upon when objections were raised. Those gunboats could anchor half a day’s journey off, knock Omdurman to pieces, and bury the faithful under the ruins. Again the prophecy was alluded to, and a move out to meet the armies finally decided upon. Every man was to be taken out of Omdurman, so that, if the infidels should succeed in reaching the town, they would find only women and children, and instead of their being the besiegers, they would become the besieged. |259| Omdurman was overrun by Abdullahi’s spies, who, professing to be friendly towards the “Government,” tried to wheedle out of known friends of the Government expressions of opinion as to the chances of success to the Mahdists’ arms, and at the same time to ascertain the general feeling of the populace. Their favourite hunting-ground was of course the Saier, where the more influential people were incarcerated. From the persistence with which these spies pressed their inquiries as to the chances of success which might attend large bodies deserting to the Ingleezee under cover of darkness—their anxiety to learn how they might approach the camp without being fired upon before they had been given an opportunity of evidencing their peaceable intentions—we came to the conclusion that Abdullahi had been advised to make a night attack. Few knew better than we did what might be the result of such a tactic. At close quarters the dervish horde was more than a match for the best-drilled army in Europe. Swift and silent in their movements, covering the ground at four or five times the speed of trained troops, every man, when the moment of attack came, accustomed to fight independently of orders, lithe and supple, nimble as cats and as bloodthirsty as starving man-eating tigers, utterly regardless of their own lives, and capable of continuing stabbing and jabbing with spear and sword while carrying half a dozen wounds, any one of which would have put a European _hors de combat_—such were the 75,000 to 80,000 warriors which the Khaleefa had ready to attack the Sirdar’s little army. Artillery, |260| rifles, and bayonets would have been but of little avail against a horde like this rushing a camp by night.