A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention: For Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Held at Washington, D.C., in February, A.D. 1861Chittenden, L. E. (Lucius Eugene)
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A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention: For Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Held at Washington, D.C., in February, A.D. 1861
Chittenden, L. E. (Lucius Eugene)
Conference Convention (1861 : Washington, D.C.); United States -- Politics and government -- 1857-1861
I ask that committee whether they are not proposing a change in the
Constitution, which, if adopted, will operate as a direct and
effectual protection of slavery in all the territories of the United
States? This appears to me to be the true question for our
consideration. I wish to know what meaning is attached by its friends
to one part of the proposed article.
It states that "the _status_ of persons owing service or labor as it
now exists shall not be changed by law," &c.; and again, "that the
rights arising out of said relations shall be subject to judicial
cognizance in the Federal courts according to the _common law_." The
_status_, then, shall not be changed. By that term I suppose condition
is intended. I understand that perfectly. There shall be no law to
change the condition, to _impair_ the rights of the slaveholder; but
shall there be no law to _protect_ these rights? Now, what is intended
by this? Why not make this provision plain, and not leave it open to
any question of construction? The ghost of the old trouble rises here,
and will not down at the bidding of any man. I believe under this
article the institution of slavery is to be protected by a most
ingenious contrivance. The _common law_, administered according to the
pro-slavery view, is to be called in for its protection.
Now I ask the chairman of the committee reporting these propositions
what he means by the _common law_? The common law, as we understand
it, is the law of freedom--not of slavery. But I do not here propose
to discuss that question. I wish to know how the truth really is. How
does the committee, how do the friends of this proposition understand
it?
By the _common law_ a slave is still a man: a person, and not a
personal chattel. He may owe service, as a child to its parent, an
apprentice to his master, but he is still a _person_ owing service. He
is all the time recognized as a _man_. As such he may own and hold
property, take it by inheritance and dispose of it at pleasure, by
will or by contract. All these rights, all the principles on which
they are founded, are in direct antagonism to slavery. The argument
may be carried much farther, but this is far enough for my purpose. By
the slave law, all this is reversed. The master owns the _body_ of the
slave, may sell or otherwise dispose of him, may make him the subject
of inheritance. The slave loses all the attributes of a person, and
becomes property as much as the horse or the ox that feeds at his
master's crib. These, in a condition of slavery are the rights of the
master over the slave. These rights the common law, under this
proposition, is to recognize, protect, and enforce. I believe I am not
mistaken in this. What other construction can you give the article? It
is a distinct proposal to engraft slavery upon the common law: to
declare in the Constitution that slavery is recognized and protected
by the common law.
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