If God's will determines in the direction of the reasonable because it is most agreeable, then we ask, why is it the most agreeable? If the reply be, because it is most reasonable, then we are only moving in a circle; but if the agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact, then inasmuch as to will is only to have the sense of the most agreeable, it follows that God has the sense of the most agreeable towards an object only because it is most agreeable to him, or awakens this sense in him; and thus the question why God wills in one direction rather than in another, or what is the cause of his determination, is not answered by Edwards, unless he says with us that the will in itself as a power to do or not to do, or to do one thing, or its opposite, is a sufficient explanation, and the only possible explanation;--or unless he refers the divine will to an antecedent cause, and this again to another antecedent cause, in an endless series--and thus introduce the two-fold error of an endless series, and an absolute necessity. All possible volitions, according to the scheme of psychology I have above given, must be either in the direction of the reason or of the sensitivity, or in the indifferency of both. If the volition be in the direction of the reason, it takes the characteristics of rational, good, &c. If in the direction of the sensitivity, it takes its characteristic from the nature of the particular desire which it obeys:--it is generous, benevolent, kind, &c.--or it is malicious, envious, unkind, vicious, &c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason? Nothing moves it; it is a cause _per se_; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction. What moves the will to go in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing moves it; it is a cause _per se_; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction.