A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"Tappan, Henry Philip
Religion
A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"
Tappan, Henry Philip
Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will; Free will and determinism
_Relative necessity_ relates to logical conclusions and events or
phenomena. Logical conclusions are always necessary relatively to the
premises, but cannot be absolutely necessary unless the premises from
which they are derived, are absolutely necessary.
All phenomena and events are necessary with only a relative necessity;
for in depending upon causes, they all ultimately depend upon will.
Considered therefore in themselves, they are contingent; for the will
which produced them, either immediately or by second or dependent
causes, is not necessitated, but free and contingent--and therefore
their non-existence is supposable. But they are necessary relatively to
will. The divine will, which gave birth to creation, is infinite; when
therefore the _nibus_ of this will was made, creation was the necessary
result. The Deity is under no necessity of willing; but when he does
will, the effect is said necessarily to follow--meaning by this, that
the _nibus_ of the divine will is essential power, and that there is no
other power that can prevent its taking effect.
Created will is under no necessity of willing; but when it does will or
make its _nibus_, effects necessarily follow, according to the connexion
established by the will of Deity, between the _nibus_ of created will
and surrounding objects. Where a _nibus_ of created will is made, and
effects do not follow, it arises from the necessarily greater force of a
resisting power, established by Deity likewise; so that whatever follows
the _nibus_ of created will, whether it be a phenomenon without, or the
mere experience of a greater resisting force, it follows by a necessity
relative to the divine will.
When we come to consider will in relation to its own volitions, we have
no more necessity, either absolute er relative; we have contingency and
absolute freedom.
Now certainty we have affirmed to relate to our knowledge or conviction
of truths and events.
Necessity is one ground of certainty, both absolute and relative. We
have a certain knowledge or conviction of that which we perceive to be
necessary in its own nature, or of which a negative is not supposable;
and this, as based upon an _absolute necessity_, may be called an
absolute certainty.
The established connexion between causes and effects, is another ground
of certainty. Causes are of two kinds; first causes, or causes _per se_,
or contingent and free causes, or will; and second or physical causes,
which are necessary with a relative necessity.
First causes are of two degrees, the infinite and the finite.
Now we are certain, that whatever God wills, will take place. This may
likewise be called an absolute certainty, because the connexion between
divine volitions and effects is absolutely necessary. It is not
supposable that God should will in vain, for that would contradict his
admitted infinity.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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