With a given state of the sensitivity and the reason, the direction of the probabilities will depend also very much upon the correlated, or upon the opposing objects and circumstances:--where the objects and circumstances agree with the state of the sensitivity and the reason, or to speak generally and collectively, with "the state of the mind," the probabilities will clearly be more easily determined than where they are opposed to "the state of the mind." The law which Edwards lays down as the law of volition universally, viz: that "the volition is as the greatest apparent good:" understanding by the term "good," as he does, simply, that which strikes us "agreeably," is indeed a general rule, according to which the volitions of characters deeply depraved may be calculated. This law represents the individual as governed wholly by his passions, and this marks the worst form of character. It is a law which cannot extend to him who is struggling under the light of his reason against passion, and consequently the probabilities in this last case must be calculated in a different way. But in relation to the former it is a sufficient rule. Probability, as well as certainty, respects only the kind and degree of our knowledge of any events, and not the causes by which those events are produced: whether these causes be necessary or contingent is another question. One great error in reasoning respecting the character of causes, in connexion with the calculation of probabilities, is the assumption that uniformity is the characteristic of necessary causes only. The reasoning may be stated in the following syllogism: In order to calculate either with certainty or probability any events we must suppose a uniform law of causation; but uniformity can exist only where there is a necessity of causation; hence, our calculations suppose a necessity of causation.