Will he defines as the desire, the affections, or the sensibility. There is no personal activity out of the affections or sensitivity. Volition is as the most agreeable, and is itself the sense of the most agreeable. But what is the cause of volition? He affirms that it cannot be will, assuming that to make will the cause of its own volitions, involves the absurdity of willing volitions or choosing choices; but at the same time he affirms the cause to be the state of the affections or will, in correlation with the nature and circumstances of objects. But all natural causes are in correlation with certain objects,--as, for example, heat is in correlation with combustibles; that is, these natural causes act only under the condition of meeting with objects so constituted as to be susceptible of being acted upon by them. So, likewise, according to Edwards's representation, we may say that the cause of volition is the nature and state of the affections or the will, acting under the condition of objects correlated to it. The sense of the most agreeable or choice cannot indeed be awakened, unless there be an object presented which shall appear the most agreeable; but then its appearing most agreeable, and its awakening the sense of the most agreeable, depends not only upon "what appears in the object viewed, but also in the manner of the view, and _the state and circumstances_ of the mind that views." (p. 22.) Now "the _state_ and _circumstances_ of the mind that views, and the _manner_ of its view," is simply the mind acting from its inherent nature and under its proper conditions, and is a representation which answers to every natural cause with which we are acquainted: the state of the mind, therefore, implying of course its inherent nature, may with as much propriety be taken as the cause of volition, on Edwards's own principles, as the nature and state of heat may be taken as the cause of combustion: but by "the state, of mind," Edwards means, evidently, the state of the will or the affections. It follows, therefore, that he makes the state of the will or the affections the cause of volition; but as the state of the will or the affections means nothing more in reference to will than the state of any other cause means in reference to that cause,--and as the state of a cause, implying of course its inherent nature or constitution, means nothing more than its character and qualities considered as a cause,--therefore he virtually and really makes will the cause of its own volitions, as much as any natural cause is the cause of its invariable sequents.