Now what is the simple idea of necessity contained in these two points of view, with their two-fold distinction? _Necessity is that which is and which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is_. 1. An event necessary by a relative particular necessity, is an event which is and cannot possibly not be or be otherwise by the opposition of an individual will. 2. An event necessary by a relative general necessity, is an event which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise by the opposition of all finite will. In these cases, opposition of will of course is supposable. 3. An event is necessary by a metaphysical particular necessity, when it is, and admits of no possible opposition from the individual will. 4. An event is necessary by a metaphysical general necessity, when it is, and cannot possibly admit of opposition even from infinite will. All this, however, in the last analysis on Edwards's system, becomes absolute necessity. The infinite will is necessarily determined by a metaphysical general necessity. All events are necessarily determined by the infinite will. Hence, all events are necessarily determined by a metaphysical general necessity. Particular and relative necessity are merely the absolute and general necessity viewed in the particular individual and relation:--the terms characterize only the manner of our view. The opposition of the particular will being predetermined by the infinite will, which comprehends all, is to the precise limit of its force absolutely necessary; and the opposite force which overcomes the opposition of the particular will, produces its phenomena necessarily not only in reference to the particular will, but also in reference to the infinite will which necessarily pre-determines it. Having thus settled the definition of necessity, and that too, on Edwards's own grounds, we are next to inquire, what is the opposite idea of contingency, and whether it has place as a rational idea? Necessity is that which is, and which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is. Contingency then, as the opposite idea, must be _that which is, or may be, and which possibly might not be, or might be otherwise than it is_. Now, contingency cannot have place with respect to anything which is independent of will;--time and space;--mathematical and metaphysical truths, for example, that all right angles are equal, that every phenomenon supposes a cause, cannot be contingent, for they are seen to be real and true in themselves. They do not arise from will, nor is it conceivable that will can alter them, for it is not conceivable that they admit of change from any source. If the idea of contingency have place as a rational idea, it must be with respect to causes, being, and phenomena, which depend upon will. The whole creation is the effect of divine volition. "God said, let there be light, and there was light:" thus did the whole creation come to be.