France has an opportunity now of consolidating her national position into one of the stablest, safest, richest on the face of the earth; self–contained; well– but not over–populated; the heir of a peculiar and splendid civilization. Neither whining about devastated districts, which are easily repaired, nor boasting of military hegemonies, which can quickly ruin her, let her lift up her head as the leader and mistress of Europe in the peaceful practices of the mind. Nevertheless, these objects are not to be gained by bargaining and cannot be imposed from without. Therefore they must not be dragged into the Reparation Settlement. This Settlement must be offered France on one condition only,—that she accepts it. But if, like Shylock, she claims her pound of flesh, then let the Law prevail. Let her have her bond, and let us have our bonds too. Let her get what she can from Germany and pay what she owes to the United States and England. The chief question for dispute is, perhaps, whether an annual payment by Germany of £63,000,000 (gold) is enough. I admit that the payment of a somewhat larger sum may prove to be within her capacity. But I recommend this figure because on the one hand it is sufficient to restore the destruction done in France, yet on the other is not so crushing that, to make Germany pay it, we need be in a position to invade her every spring and autumn. We must fix the payment at an amount which Germany herself will recognize as not unjust, and which is sufficiently within her maximum capacity to leave her some incentive to work and pay it off. Suppose that we knew the theoretical maximum of Germany’s capacity to produce and sell abroad a surplus of goods, or could hit on some sliding scale which would automatically absorb year by year whatever surplus there was; should we be wise to demand it? The project of extracting at the point of the bayonet—for that is what it would mean—a payment so heavy that it would never be paid voluntarily, and to go on doing this until all the makers of the Peace Treaty of Versailles have been long dead and buried in their local Valhallas, is neither good nor sensible. My own proposals, moderate though they may seem in comparison with others, throw on Germany a very great burden. They procure for France an enormous benefit. Frenchmen, having fed to satiety on imaginary figures, are nearly ready, I think, to find a surprising flavor and piquancy in real ones. Let them consider what a tremendous financial strength my scheme would give them. Freed from external debt, they would receive in real values each year for thirty years a payment equivalent in gold to nearly half the gold reserve now held by the Bank of France; and at the end of the set period Germany would have paid back ten times what she took after 1870.