In either event Germany is faced with an unfortunate prospect. If the present exchange depreciation persists and the internal price level becomes adjusted to it, the resulting redistribution of wealth between different classes of the community will amount to a social catastrophe. If, on the other hand, there is a recovery in the exchange, the cessation of the existing artificial stimulus to industry and of the Stock Exchange boom based on the depreciating mark may lead to a financial catastrophe.[59] Those responsible for the financial policy of Germany have a problem of incomparable difficulty in front of them. Until the Reparation liability has been settled reasonably, it is scarcely worth the while of any one to trouble his head about a problem which is insoluble. When stabilization has become a practicable policy, the wisest course will probably be to stabilize at whatever level prices and trade seem most nearly adjusted to at that date. FOOTNOTES: [32] The preamble states that the settlement is “in accordance with Article 233 of the Treaty of Versailles.” This Article prescribes that the scheme of payments shall provide for the discharge of the liabilities within _thirty_ years, any unpaid balance at the end of this period being “postponed” or “handled otherwise.” In the actual settlement, however, the initial limitation to thirty years has been neglected. [33] This actual text is printed below in full, Appendix No. 7. [34] It is not competent for a single Ally (_e.g._, Portugal) to claim its share of the Bonds and market them at the best price obtainable. Under the Treaty of Versailles Part VIII. Annex II. 13 (_b_) questions relating to the marketing of these Bonds can only be settled by _unanimous_ decision of the Reparation Commission. [35] The Committee is to coöpt three representatives of neutrals when a sufficient proportion of the Bonds to justify their representation has been marketed on neutral Stock Exchanges. [36] And it really is an adequate rejoinder to deputies like M. Forgeot. If a partisan or a child wants a silly, harmful thing, it may be better to meet him with a silly, harmless thing, than with explanations he cannot understand. This is the traditional wisdom of statesmen and nursemaids. [37] The effect of this provision is discussed in _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_, pp. 165–167. [38] Cf. Baruch, _The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty_, p. 46; and Lamont, _What Really Happened at Paris_, p. 275. [39] Assuming exports of 10 milliards, which is double the actual figure of 1920. [40] _The Truth about the Treaty_, p. 305.