A Revision of the Treaty: Being a Sequel to The Economic Consequence of the PeaceKeynes, John Maynard
History
A Revision of the Treaty: Being a Sequel to The Economic Consequence of the Peace
Keynes, John Maynard
Treaty of Versailles (1919 June 28); World War, 1914-1918 -- Reparations
But most people in the countries of Germany’s former enemies are not
ready to excite themselves very much, even if my view is accepted.
The passage at the head of this chapter describes a common attitude.
International politics is a scoundrel’s game and always has been, and
the private citizen can scarcely feel himself personally responsible.
If our enemy breaks the rules, his action may furnish us with an
appropriate opportunity for expressing our feelings; but this must not
be taken to commit us to a cool opinion that such things have never
happened before and must never happen again. Sensitive and honorable
patriots do not like it, but they “more or less shrug” their shoulders.
There is some common sense in this. I cannot deny it. International
morality, interpreted as a crude legalism, might be very injurious to
the world. It is at least as true of these vast–scale transactions,
as of private affairs, that we judge wrongly if we do not take into
account _everything_. And it is superficial to appeal, the other way
round, to the principles which do duty when Propaganda is blistering
herd emotion with its brew of passion, sentiment, self–interest, and
moral fiddlesticks.
But whilst I see that nothing rare has happened and that men’s motives
are much as usual, I do still think that this particular act was an
exceptionally mean one, made worse by hypocritical professions of moral
purpose. My object in returning to it is partly historical and partly
practical. New material of high interest is available to instruct us
about the course of events. And if for practical reasons we can agree
to drop this claim, we shall make a settlement easier.
* * * * *
Those who think that it was contrary to the Allies’ engagements to
charge pensions against the enemy base this opinion on the terms
notified to the German Government by President Wilson, with the
authority of the Allies, on November 5, 1918, subject to which Germany
accepted the Armistice conditions.[93] The contrary opinion that the
Allies were fully entitled to charge pensions if they considered
it expedient to do so, has been supported by two distinct lines of
argument: first that the Armistice conditions of November 11, 1918,
were not _subject_ to President Wilson’s notification of November 5,
1918, but _superseded_ it, more particularly regarding Reparation;
and alternatively that the wording of President Wilson’s notification
properly understood does not exclude Pensions.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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