A Revision of the Treaty: Being a Sequel to The Economic Consequence of the PeaceKeynes, John Maynard
History
A Revision of the Treaty: Being a Sequel to The Economic Consequence of the Peace
Keynes, John Maynard
Treaty of Versailles (1919 June 28); World War, 1914-1918 -- Reparations
Various arguments were employed in the early stages, the British
delegates to the Reparation Committee of the Peace Conference, namely,
Mr. Hughes, Lord Sumner and Lord Cunliffe, supporting the demand for
complete war costs and not merely reparation for damage. They urged
(1) that one of the principles enunciated by President Wilson was that
each item of the Treaty should be just, and that it was in accordance
with the general principles of justice to throw on Germany the whole
costs of the war; and (2) that Great Britain’s war costs had resulted
from Germany’s breach of the Treaty of Neutrality of Belgium, and that
therefore Great Britain (but not necessarily, on this argument, all the
other Allies) was entitled to complete repayment in accordance with the
general principles of International law. These general arguments were,
I think, overwhelmed by the speeches made on behalf of the American
delegates by Mr. John Foster Dulles. The following are extracts from
what he said: “If it is in accordance with our sentiment that the
principles of reparation be severe, and in accord with our material
interest that these principles be all inclusive, why, in defiance of
these motives, have we proposed reparation in certain limited ways
only? It is because, gentlemen, we do not regard ourselves as free. We
are not here to consider as a novel proposal what reparation the enemy
should in justice pay; we have not before us a blank page upon which
we are free to write what we will. We have before us a page, it is
true; but one which is already filled with writing, and at the bottom
are the signatures of Mr. Wilson, of Mr. Orlando, of M. Clemenceau,
and of Mr. Lloyd George. You are all aware, I am sure, of the writing
to which I refer: it is the agreed basis of peace with Germany.”
Mr. Dulles then recapitulated the relevant passages and continued:
“Can there be any question that this agreement does constitute a
limitation? It is perfectly obvious that it was recognized at the time
of the negotiations in October and November 1918 that the reparation
then specified for would limit the Associated Governments as to the
reparation which they could demand of the enemy as a condition of
peace. The whole purpose of Germany was to ascertain the maximum which
would be demanded of her in the terms of peace, and the action of the
Allies in especially stipulating at that time, for an enlargement of
the original proposal respecting reparation is explicable only on the
theory that it was understood that once an agreement was concluded
they would no longer be free to specify the reparation which Germany
must make. We have thus agreed that we would give Germany peace if
she would do certain specified things. Is it now open to us to say,
‘Yes, but before you get peace you must do other and further things’?
We have said to Germany, ‘You may have peace if among other things
you perform certain acts of reparation which will cost you, say, ten
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