A Revision of the Treaty: Being a Sequel to The Economic Consequence of the PeaceKeynes, John Maynard
History
A Revision of the Treaty: Being a Sequel to The Economic Consequence of the Peace
Keynes, John Maynard
Treaty of Versailles (1919 June 28); World War, 1914-1918 -- Reparations
[96] The following particulars are taken from _Les Négociations
Secrètes et les Quatre Armistices avec pièces justificatives_ by
“Mermeix,” published at Paris by Ollendorff, 1921. This remarkable
volume has not received the attention it deserves. The greater part of
it consists of a verbatim transcript of the secret _Procès Verbaux_
of those meetings of the Supreme Council of the Allies which were
concerned with the Armistice Terms. On the face of it this disclosure
is authentic and is corroborated in part by M. Tardieu. There are many
passages of extraordinary interest on points not connected with my
present topic, as for example the discussion of the question whether
the Allies should insist on the surrender of the German fleet if the
Germans made trouble about it. Marshal Foch emerges from this record
very honorably, as determined that nothing unnecessary should be
demanded of the enemy, and that no blood should be spilt for a vain or
trifling object. Sir Douglas Haig was of the same opinion. In reply to
Col. House, Foch spoke thus: “If they accept the terms of the Armistice
we are imposing on them, it is a capitulation. Such a capitulation
gives us everything we could get from the greatest victory. In such
circumstances I cannot admit that I have the right to risk the life of
a single man more.” And again on October 31: “If our conditions are
accepted we can wish for nothing better. We make war only to attain
our ends, and we do not want to prolong it uselessly.” In reply to
a proposal by Mr. Balfour that the Germans in evacuating the East
should leave one–third of their arms behind them, Foch observed: “The
intrusion of all these clauses makes our document chimerical, since
the greater part of the conditions are incapable of being executed.
We should do well to be sparing with these unrealizable injunctions.”
Towards Austria also he was humane and feared the prolongation of the
blockade which the politicians were proposing. “I intervene,” he said
on October 31, 1918, “in a matter which is not a military one strictly
speaking. We are to maintain the blockade until Peace, that is to say
until we have made a new Austria. That may take a long time; which
means a country condemned to famine and perhaps impelled to anarchy.”
[97] This is corroborated by M. Tardieu, _op. cit._, p. 71.
[98] See Mermeix, _op. cit._, pp. 226–250.
[99] This very important remark by Mr. Bonar Law is also quoted by M.
Tardieu (_op. cit._, p. 70) and is therefore of undoubted authenticity.
[100] “Il serait prudent de mettre en tête des questions financières
une clause réservant les revendications futures des Alliés et je vous
propose le texte suivant: ‘Sous réserve de toutes revendications et
réclamations ultérieures de la part des Alliés.’”
[101] That is to say, this text ran, “Sous réserve de toute
renonciation et réclamation ultérieure,” instead of “Sous réserve de
toutes revendications et réclamations ultérieures.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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