In the first place, Japan was determined not to be bluffed by Russia: her first stroke was intended to make that known to her adversary. Next, she intended to drive the Russians out of Korea: that she promptly effected. Then her object was to destroy the Russian fleet, and deprive Russia of a naval base in the Far East, so that for many years to come Japan may enjoy peace so far as Russia is concerned. This is in process of execution, and will be effected before Japan stays her hand. Thus far we are upon firm ground. It is doubtful whether Japan intends to turn Russia out of the three provinces which comprise Manchuria, or even means to attempt so much. Japan would like the Russian forces to retreat upon Harbin quickly. If that were done, she believes that with the forces now at her command she could attack and capture Harbin--which has only improvised defensive works--and so bring about a further withdrawal, compelling the Russian Commander-in-Chief to decide whether he will attempt to hold the railway between Harbin and Vladivostok, or abandon the eastern line and fall back towards Khailar and Siberia. It will be a serious situation. With the Japanese at Harbin, the Russian retreat westward may be cut off by a river force proceeding up the Nonni to the railway crossing south of Tsitsikar. The abandonment of the eastern line will mean the fall of Vladivostok, and leave the Ussuri province and all the Russian settlements on the Amur at the mercy of the Japanese army. There cannot be any doubt that Japan will try her utmost to reach and occupy Harbin. Very possibly she will attempt to occupy that position permanently, since it is the junction of the railways from Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and is also valuable because the Sungari, the most important tributary of the Amur, gives communication to many of the Russian settlements in Northern Manchuria and Eastern Siberia.