A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the EncheiridionEpictetus
Philosophy
A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
Epictetus
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
IN WHAT A MAN OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED WHO HAS MADE PROFICIENCY; AND THAT
WE NEGLECT THE CHIEF THINGS.—There are three things (topics, [Greek:
topoi]) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and
good. The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may
not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that
which he does not desire. The second concerns the movements towards an
object and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a
man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not
carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and
rashness in judgment, and generally it concerns the assents ([Greek:
sugchatatheseis]). Of these topics the chief and the most urgent is
that which relates to the affects ([Greek: ta pathae] perturbations);
for an affect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain
that which a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish to
avoid. This is that which brings in perturbations, disorders, bad
fortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and envy; that which makes
men envious and jealous; and by these causes we are unable even to
listen to the precepts of reason. The second topic concerns the duties
of a man; for I ought not to be free from affects ([Greek: apathae])
like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations ([Greek:
scheseis]) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father,
as a citizen.
The third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are making
proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that
not even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in
intoxication, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our
power. But the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and the
second (the affects and duties), employ themselves on the third, using
sophistical arguments ([Greek: metapiptontas]), making conclusions from
questioning, employing hypotheses, lying. For a man must, it is said,
when employed on these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who
must? The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting to you.
Have you successfully worked out the rest? Are you free from deception
in the matter of money? If you see a beautiful girl do you resist the
appearance? If your neighbor obtains an estate by will, are you not
vexed? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeable
firmness of mind ([Greek: ametaptosia])? Wretch, you hear these very
things with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and with
inquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come
and tell you that in a certain conversation in which the question was,
Who is the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a certain
person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only a
finger’s length stretches out to two cubits. But if another who is
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