A Series of Lessons in Gnani Yoga: The Yoga of WisdomAtkinson, William Walker
Religion
A Series of Lessons in Gnani Yoga: The Yoga of Wisdom
Atkinson, William Walker
Yoga, Jñana
The story of Man, the Individual, begins amidst humble surroundings.
Primitive man, but little above the level of the lower animals in point
of intelligence, has nevertheless that distinguishing mark of
Individuality--"Self-Consciousness," which is the demarkation between
Beast and Man. And even the lowest of the lowest races had at least a
"trace" of this Self-Consciousness, which made of them individuals, and
caused the fragment of the race-soul to separate itself from the
general principle animating the race, and to fasten its "I" conscious
upon itself, rather than upon the underlying race-soul, along
instinctive lines. Do you know just what this Self-Consciousness is,
and how it differs from the Physical Consciousness of the lower
animals? Perhaps we had better pause a moment to consider it at this
place.
The lower animals are of course conscious of the bodies, and their
wants, feelings, emotions, desires, etc., and their actions are in
response to the animating impulses coming from this plane of
consciousness. But it stops there. They "know," but they do not "know
that they know"; that is, they have not yet arrived at a state in which
they can think of themselves as "I," and to reason upon their thoughts
and mental operations. It is like the consciousness of a very young
child, which feels and knows its sensations and wants, but is unable to
think of itself as "I," and to turn the mental gaze inward. In another
book of these series we have used the illustration of the horse which
has been left standing out in the cold sleet and rain, and which
undoubtedly feels and knows the unpleasant sensations arising
therefrom, and longs to get away from the unpleasant environment. But,
still, he is unable to analyze his mental states and wonder whether his
master will come out to him soon, or think how cruel it is to keep him
out of his warm comfortable stable; or wonder whether he will be taken
out in the cold rain again tomorrow; or feel envious of other horses
who are indoors; or wonder why he is kept out cold nights, etc., etc.
In short, the horse is unable to think as would a reasoning man under
just the same circumstances. He is aware of the discomfort, just as
would be the man; and he would run away home, if he were able, just as
would the man. But he is not able to pity himself, nor to think about
his personality, as would a man--he is not able to wonder whether life
is worth the living, etc., as would a man. He "knows" but is not able
to reflect upon the "knowing."
In the above illustration, the principal point is that the horse does
not "know himself" as an entity, while even the most primitive man is
able to so recognize himself as an "I." If the horse were able to think
in words, he would think "feel," "cold," "hurt," etc., but he would be
unable to think "_I_ feel; _I_ am cold; _I_ am hurt," etc. The thought
"I" would be missing.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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