When the Revolution of the Belgians against Austrian rule broke out in 1789, the Elector Frederick-William of Prussia tried in vain to obtain from the other powers, England and Holland, the recognition of the Belgian Republic. He proposed that they should recognize the independence of Belgium and compel the Belgians “to establish a firm, strong constitution, in conformity with the interests of the Allies...; to create, subject to the advice of the Allies, a respectable military state that would inspire confidence; to avoid alliances with powers, enemies of the Allies, and also trade with them.” As Prussia was ready to make war on Austria, her hereditary enemy, Emperor Leopold II declared that he would, in case of war, cede the “Austrian Netherlands” to France. This England could not have permitted, and therefore that country withdrew support from Prussia, causing the Elector Frederick-William to abandon his plan concerning Belgium. The French conquest of Belgium entirely changed the policy of the European powers with regard to the Belgian problem. England now saw the French menace facing her own shores, and, according to her traditional policy, began to take measures to avoid the danger. On November 13, 1813, Lord Castlereagh wrote to the English ambassador in Vienna: “I must particularly recommend you to pay attention to Antwerp.... Leaving Antwerp in the hands of France means, or almost means, imposing on us the necessity of a continuous state of war.” It was now England that was specially interested in the future status of Belgium, and it is from that country that emanated the idea, forcibly expressed, of establishing a strong bulwark against France by the creation of the neutral kingdom of the Netherlands. The idea, supported by Prussia, which, as we have seen, had advocated it some years before, was, however, this time expressed by Lord Castlereagh; and the aggrandizement of Holland by its union with Belgium was strongly supported by the Duke of Wellington. Accordingly, on July 31, 1814, the Belgian provinces were formally handed over to the Prince of Orange, whom the Dutch had made their sovereign the year before. The arrangement was confirmed by the Congress of Vienna, and made to include Liège and Luxemburg. The union of Belgium and Holland was the work of diplomacy: the Belgians had not even been consulted. It was an essentially bad combination. Had the “complete and intimate fusion,” of which the diplomats spoke, been possible between both countries, the projectors would have accomplished an admirable work, offering the surest guaranties for the maintenance of European peace and the durability of their own fabric. But unfortunately the conception was utopian.