In response to this invitation Abu Raqwa started his advance into Egypt. The news of his undertaking threw the country into great alarm. The Druze books describe Hakim himself as completely unmoved, but other writers speak of him as seriously frightened and even planning to retire to Syria if all came to the worst. Meanwhile he sent to Syria for the Hamdanid armies, and put the general Fadi b. Salih in command of the native forces. With these Syrians and such other levies as he could raise Fadl went out and encamped at Gizeh, waiting for the invaders. At their arrival Fadl did not give battle, but manoeuvred so as to evade them, and by his position at Gizeh prevented them from being able to make a crossing of the river as that would have exposed them to his attack whilst going across. Meanwhile he managed to open up correspondence with some of the subordinate officers, amongst them with a certain captain of the B. Qorra named Mahdi, who agreed to keep him informed of all Abu Raqwa’s plans. After some delay the invaders advanced direct upon the Fatimid general who was unable to evade the movement, and so an engagement was forced near Kum Sharik. It was not decisive, but it was very severe, and caused Fadl to determine not to give battle again if he could possibly avoid doing so. Owing to his severe losses he was compelled to retire, but still lay between Abu Raqwa and the river so as to be able to make a flank attack if the Berbers tried to cross. Abu Raqwa and his men, however, were perfectly confident that success was assured, and made plans for their future policy as conquerors. They decided to settle in Egypt and rule that country and the adjacent North Africa, leaving Syria to the Arabs. This scheme repeated the old plan of a purely Berber state in Africa with the Arabs excluded and sent back to their own country. Fadl received full information as to these projects. But there was treachery in his own army also: the Arab leaders brought from Syria had been tampered with by Abu Raqwa’s agents who tried to persuade them that they were making a mistake in fighting for the Fatimid state, and that it would be more satisfactory to divide its territories between them, the Africans under Abu Raqwa taking Egypt, the Asiatic Arabs taking Syria. It was agreed therefore that Abu Raqwa should make a night attack on Fadl’s army and, as soon as the attack commenced, the Syrian leaders were to march their men over to the enemy and thus an easy victory would be assured. But Fadl was fully informed of this plan, and the evening before the projected attack he invited the Arab leaders to dine with him. When the dinner was over and the guests wished to retire he detained them and, on one pretext or another, kept them near him until the enemy attacked. Even then he still detained them and sent orders to the Syrians to engage their opponents, and the Syrians, ignorant of the private plans of their leaders, did so. The followers of Abu Raqwa were