to a disciplined force with a code of honour. It has been said already that some time passed, after the formation of Pitt’s great ministry in June 1757, before the naval and military powers of the country could be co-ordinated for definite and profitable purposes. One of the uses to which they were put reflects little honour on the sagacity of the Great Commoner. He reverted to futile expeditions against the coast of France. By the inevitable working of unvarying conditions these revivals of old errors produced identical results. They do not deserve that more time should be spent on them than is necessary to record that they took place, and came to an unavoidable failure. In September of 1757 Hawke sailed with a strong squadron, carrying a detachment of troops under General Mordaunt, for the purpose of taking Rochefort. He sailed on the 8th of that month, and by the 6th October he was back, and Rochefort was not taken. We did plunder the poor little island of Aix, and that was all—all except the ensuing court of inquiry and wrangle. Yet it was decided to make another and more serious effort next year, for Pitt clung with persistence to this part of his military policy. His critics called it breaking windows with guineas, but he valued it for two reasons. He hoped that the pressure on their coast would constrain the French to withdraw part of their troops from Germany where they were threatening the king’s electorate of Hanover, and were weighing on our ally the King of Prussia. It was a bad reason, for if an effectual diversion was to be made we ought to have landed a substantial army, capable of establishing itself in France. The second and perhaps better reason was given in 1759 by Captain Hervey of the =Monmouth=, who was serving in the Brest blockade, under Hawke, when he landed on the little island of Molines and levied a contribution on the inhabitants. The priest appealed to him to spare their poverty, and Captain Hervey answered, “That he was sorry to distress the poor inhabitants, but what he now did was to show the enemy and all Europe that the French could not protect their people in their own sight, much less dare the invasion of England.” After the shameful panic of 1756, there was something to be said for the policy of showing that our fleets could sweep along the French coast, and that the enemy would not dare to give them battle. This purpose at least was achieved to the full by the great combined expedition which made three sorties in 1758. A fleet of twenty-four sail of the line under Anson convoyed 14,000 troops under the Duke of Marlborough to St. Malo in June. The place proved too strong, and the expedition came back to the Isle of Wight. A scheme for attacking Cherbourg was defeated by a storm, and the expedition returned. The Duke of Marlborough was now replaced by General Bligh, a veteran called over from Ireland to take up the “buccaneering” work when officers of more interest had come to regard it with weary disgust.