We have now come to the _annus mirabilis_ of the Seven Years’ War, 1759. It was a year of extraordinary events and changes of fortune, and was also emphatically the year of the navy. From first to last the fleet was our main weapon, but both before and after 1759 it met with no worthy adversary at sea, and was mostly employed in co-operating with troops. In this year it had to contend with other fleets, and the tale to be told is one of true naval warfare. The experience of 1758 had not been wholly lost on the French Government, incapable as it was. It had been brought to see that its fleets must be better used if its colonial possessions were not to fall one by one before such expeditions as had taken Louisbourg. To meet the English everywhere was plainly impossible, but there was one course which, if followed with success, would bring swift and decisive victory. England itself might be invaded. A blow struck home to her heart would be mortal, and would at once undo all the effect of her successes in distant seas. The ministers of King Louis XV. were the more encouraged to try the venture because they were convinced that the British fleet would be so weakened by distant enterprises as to be unable to collect a superior force in the Channel. So a plan such as had been laid before by Louis XIV., and was to be laid again by Napoleon, was drafted. Troops were collected on the coast of Normandy, and at Vannes in the Morbihan, on the south side of Brittany. To clear the way for them the fleet was to be used in a fashion which shows that the boasted originality of Napoleon’s genius was in this, as in so many other fields, largely mere imitation of the methods of the old monarchy. The first object was to draw off and distract the British fleet. A squadron was to be prepared at Dunkirk, and put under the command of Thurot, a very brave and honest privateer captain, who had made for himself a reputation. It was to sail north and draw off our ships by menacing the coasts of Scotland and Ireland. The main French fleet had its headquarters at Brest, and was to be led by M. de Conflans, Vice-Admiral and Marshal of France. La Clue was to sail from Toulon, pass the Straits and join the fleet at Brest. The two were then to cover the passage of the army under the Duc d’Aiguillon, which again was to come out from Vannes in transports, and from the coast of Normandy in flat-bottomed vessels building at Havre. It will be seen that this is essentially Napoleon’s plan in a simpler and less hazardous form, with the further merit that it was to be executed by the French fleet alone, and not with the co-operation of a most inefficient and reluctant ally. His scheme could not have come within measurable distance of success save by miracles of good fortune and the help of incredible ineptitude on our side on which he had no right to calculate. Of this one it may be said that if the French fleet had been efficient, and the chiefs prompt and bold, it might at least have