Mention has already been made of the co-operation of Admiral Watson and Clive in the suppression of Geriah early in 1756. They reached Madras on the 20th June, one day before the taking of Calcutta by Suraj-ud-Daulah and the tragedy of the Black Hole. The vengeance for this outrage is one of the most famous stories in our history. But it belongs to the history of the East India Company rather than to that of the navy. Against an enemy who possessed no ships, the fleet could only act by providing for the transport of troops, covering their landing, attacking forts on the coast, and landing stores or naval brigades. Admiral Watson did his share in the work actively in the early months of 1757, and he was passively consenting to the fraud by which his name was forged for the purpose of cheating Omichand. A small naval brigade shared in the battle of Plassey. In any case the sudden extension of British power which came out of the overthrow of Suraj-ud-Daulah, would probably have led to a renewal of the conflict with the French Company, but hostilities were precipitated by the European and American quarrels of the two countries. In March 1757 the French fort at Chandernagore, just above Calcutta, was occupied after a sharp fight, in the midst of the complicated negotiations and conflicts with the Nabob of Bengal. Admiral Watson did not live to take part in the naval conflict with the French, but died in September of 1757. He was succeeded by Rear-Admiral George Pocock, to whom it fell to command at sea in the decisive struggle for supremacy in India. No attempt will be made here to describe the series of battles fought during 1758 and 1759. These actions present little more than a weary repetition of examples of the working of the pedantic Fighting Instructions. Though Pocock was unquestionably a man of great energy, strong mind, and the utmost zeal for the service, he wanted the originality and independence of intellect to break away from the traditional method. Thus action after action presents the same monotonous picture. The British squadron works to windward to secure the power to force on battle, and comes down in line to engage the enemy from end to end. The French wait for the attack, fire to cripple the rigging of those of our vessels which present themselves first to its blows, and then slip away, damaged more or less severely, but never so seriously that they cannot reach the port they are steering for, while our crews are knotting, splicing, and replacing ropes and spars. It was by no single well-delivered blow, by no telling victory that we finally forced our opponent out of the Indian Seas, but by persistence, by a better average of practical seamanship, by the possession of greater resources—by, as it were, slowly pushing him in front of us as by a steady application of weight.