This campaign has certain features of interest. Though Pocock’s arms were tied by the Fighting Instructions, he showed a vigour in attack and a persistency of effort which promised final victory over his timid opponent. But the working of those instructions is full of warning. It has been ingeniously argued by the late Admiral Colomb that the presence of an effective naval force, for which he invented—or to which he adapted—the name of “Fleet in Being,” on a given coast will of itself so act as to stop all operations against that coast on the part of an enemy. Yet in this case, though the British squadron was at least a full match for the French, and Pocock’s will to strike was of the best, we see that he failed both to prevent D’Aché from landing soldiers at Pondicherry and from co-operating in the taking of Cuddalore. He failed partly because of the timidity of the Council which called him back to Madras, but mainly because he was tied by formal rules of battle which did not allow him to develop freely the whole strength of his command. Had he been free to take his fleet always where he thought best, and to use it unbound by foolish laws, had he been one of those great and original captains who have the moral and intellectual courage to break away from worn-out traditions, there can be no doubt that his campaign of 1758 on the coast of Coromandel would have been marked by a decisive battle. It might well have been far more costly than the two engagements actually fought, but we may assert, without undue patriotic confidence in our own navy, that it would have broken the French naval forces in those seas to pieces. As it was, the balance of advantage was rather with the French than with us. The moral of the story is surely, that it is not enough for a fleet to be “in being” if it is not also in action, and that there is but little use in action which is not allowed to drive its blows home to the heart.