This failure remained a subject of bitter regret to Rodney. At the time and afterwards he attributed it to the deliberate misconduct of his captains, who, he said, let the French escape in a factious spirit of opposition to the king’s Government. More credible explanations are: the influence of unintelligent rules of tactics; and his own partly valetudinarian and partly arrogant solitude. If he had explained to his captains the principles on which he meant to fight, his orders would not have been misunderstood, and it would have been impossible that they should have been disobeyed. The merit of his proposed plan is manifest when it is compared with the mechanical rules of the Fighting Orders. Yet that merit may be, and has been, exaggerated. Such a concentration as he designed could always be answered by an enemy who was prompt to reverse his order and to close his line, as Guichen showed in the early hours of the day. So long as the British fleet engaged to windward, there could be but indifferent security that the enemy would not cripple its rigging and slip away. Rodney, in short, set the example of innovating on the formal tactics of the time, but before great results could be obtained much more had to be done than he showed himself prepared to do on the 17th April 1780. The operations following the battle were marked by no decisive event. Rodney, after keeping for a few days between Guichen and Fort Royal, returned to Choque Bay to refit. Several of his ships, and the flagship among them, the =Sandwich=, had been severely damaged. Guichen, after visiting the Dutch island of St. Eustatius to procure stores, stationed himself to windward—that is, to the west of Martinique. His object was to effect a junction with a Spanish squadron under Admiral Solano, which was known to be on its way from Europe. Rodney followed him. Exasperated by the want of support he had suffered from in the last action, he put his fleet through a severe course of manœuvres, and drew the reins of discipline tight with a severity which aroused the wrath of his subordinate, Sir Hyde Parker, who on his return home was with difficulty restrained by the advice of Sandwich from creating another naval scandal. Twice Rodney came close enough to Guichen to bring on partial actions—on the 15th and 19th May. But the Frenchman was resolved not to be brought to close action. He had the weather-gage, and kept it so carefully that only the van ships of the British line came into action with the rear of the French as the two fleets passed on opposite tacks. It was characteristic of the spirit and principles of the French Navy of the time that Guichen was much praised for, and was visibly proud of, his success in baffling Rodney’s attempts to bring him to battle. Rodney, who might have cut off two or three of the rearmost French ships if he had ordered his van to steer into the enemy’s line, was not prepared to depart wholly from the old methods.