The battle of the 12th April, or of the Saints, or of Dominica, for it is known by all names, may be said to have been the end of the naval war in America; for no operations of any consequence took place there till the peace of the following year. The discontent of Rodney’s captains was not made public. To the nation which had seen no such success in the war hitherto, the victory appeared wholly glorious, and was a very natural subject of triumphant satisfaction. Rodney was made a peer of Great Britain, and Sir Samuel Hood received an Irish peerage. In naval history the battle is chiefly remarkable because it marked the end of the old formal, or rather pedantic, style of fighting established in the seventeenth century. It showed naval officers by practical example that the way to win decisive victories was to break into the formation of the enemy, even if they did thereby sacrifice their own, and so bring about a mêlée in which individual superiority would have full play. The war can now be wound up by a brief account of the final relief of Gibraltar and of the contemporary naval campaigns in the East Indies. During September of 1782 Gibraltar received, and had repelled with ease, the last attack of the Spaniards and their French allies. Floating batteries, from which much had been expected, were brought against the fortress in vain. But as the allies were masters of the Straits, the garrison was in danger of being reduced by starvation. Reliefs of stores and men were urgently needed. The British Government was hard pressed to find ships for the service. A Dutch squadron was known to be ready for service in the Texel, and as the concentration of French and Spanish warships in front of Gibraltar made the employment of a large force necessary, the Ministry was in no small perplexity lest, while Gibraltar was being relieved, the coast of England should be attacked. But the Dutch were timid. The naval advisers of the Government, of whom Keppel, then at the head of the Admiralty, was one, convinced it that the risk was not great. Public opinion, too, would not have tolerated further delay. On the 11th September, two days before the final attack of the allies, Howe left Spithead with thirty-four sail of the line, eight frigates, and a number of fireships. He had under his protection a convoy of transports carrying provisions, military stores, and two regiments of infantry, the 25th and the 59th. Every effort had been made to provide the admiral with the best force the country could collect. But the navy was severely taxed to meet the calls made upon it. Many of the ships had been fitted out with difficulty, and though the best officers and men available were sent on the service, complaints were heard that the crews were made up by the inclusion of inferior elements. At a later period the condition of Howe’s fleet was the subject of an undignified squabble between him and Keppel.