Gibraltar having been taken was to be held, and as it was not yet sufficiently settled to be able to rely for long on its own strength, its salvation depended on Leake’s squadron. Sir John was hardly a great commander, yet from the day that he relieved Londonderry his conduct was always marked by a certain alacrity in action. During the winter of 1704-05, he stood by Gibraltar loyally and with energy. The Spaniards had collected an army to retake the town, and early in October the Prince of Hesse called for help. Leake came at once from Lagos with stores and encouragement. On hearing that a French naval force was approaching, he put to sea. Uncertainty as to the strength of the enemy and some damage received by bad weather induced him to return to Lisbon to refit, but he was back reinforced by the 29th October and had the deserved good luck to capture three French warships. Leake now remained by Gibraltar till the 21st December. On both these visits his guns relieved the pressure on the town by firing into the camp of the besiegers. Then he again went back to Lisbon. During his absence a French squadron under M. de Pointis arrived to form a blockade. On the 10th March, Leake was back again, and this time he destroyed five Frenchmen including the flagship in Gibraltar Bay. The remainder of Pointis’ ships fled to Toulon. Leake now remained till March. The besieging army broke up its camp in despair, and Gibraltar was safe. Leake was able to sail for England and reached it in April. As Gibraltar had been taken, so it was saved by the fleet, for the sake of which we hold it, and on which in the last resort it depends. It is a striking coincidence that the year of the taking of Gibraltar was also the year of Blenheim. The superiority passed to the allies on land as well as on sea. Henceforth the French king could do less and less with his navy. Year after year the Grand Fleets poured out of the Channel in spring, and swept like a great tidal wave round the coasts of the Peninsula, and into the Gulf of Lyons. They made the capture of Barcelona, and its relief, possible. It was they who enabled General Stanhope to take Port Mahon which, together with Gibraltar, remained in our hands at the end of the war. They kept the Hapsburg cause alive in Spain for a space. Yet their operations present only a repetition of similar incidents, and enforce always the same lessons: that where the road lies over the sea, the ships only can stop it for an invader, or open it for invasion—an obvious but apparently an easily forgotten truth.