return, and with difficulty they reached again the coast of Greece. Shortly afterward M. Antonius succeeded in bringing over the remainder of the army. Pompey meantime had retired to some high ground near Dyrrhachium, and, as he would not venture a battle with Caesar's veterans, Caesar began to blockade him in his position, and to draw lines of circumvallation of an extraordinary extent. They were nearly completed when Pompey forced a passage through them, and drove back Caesar's legions with considerable loss. Caesar thus found himself compelled to retreat from his present position, and accordingly commenced his march for Thessaly. Pompey's policy of avoiding a general engagement with Caesar's veterans till he could place more reliance upon his own troops was undoubtedly a wise one, and had been hitherto crowned with success; but he was prevented from carrying out the prudent plan which he had formed for conducting the campaign. His camp was filled with a multitude of Roman nobles, unacquainted with war, and anxious to return to their estates in Italy and to the luxuries of the capital. His unwillingness to fight was set down to love of power and anxiety to keep the Senate in subjection. Stung with the reproaches with which he was assailed, and elated in some degree by his victory at Dyrrhachium, he resolved to bring the contest to an issue. Accordingly, he offered battle to Caesar in the plain of Pharsalus, or Pharsalia, in Thessaly. The numbers on either side were very unequal: Pompey had 45,000 foot-soldiers and 7000 horse, Caesar 22,000 foot-soldiers and 1000 horse. The battle, which was fought on the 9th of August, B.C. 48, according to the old calendar,[70] ended in the total defeat of Pompey's army.